Why Terminate Parental Rights by Garrison, Marsha
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
1983
Why Terminate Parental Rights
Marsha Garrison
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
35 Stan. L. Rev. 423 (1983)
Why Terminate Parental Rights?
Marsha Garrison*
Some 500,000 American children live in foster homes as wards of
the state.' Most of them have spent years2 in the foster care system.3
While in foster care, many have lost contact with their natural par-
ents4 and have suffered frequent shifts from one foster home to an-
other,5 thus losing the opportunity to form a close and long-lasting
relationship with any parental figure. This problem, now generally
described as "foster care drift," has drawn widespread attention in
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J.D. 1975, Harvard Law School.
I wish to thank Joseph Goldstein, Trudy Hayden, Susan Herman, Alice Leonard, and
Michael Wald for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. A study commissioned by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare esti-
mated that, in 1977, 508,000 children were in foster care: 400,000 children were in foster
families, 35,000 were in public or private group homes, 30,000 were in residential treatment
centers, and 43,000 were in public or private child care institutions. See S. REP. No. 336, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. 10-1 l, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1460 [hereinafter cited
as S. REP. No. 336]; see also J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, CHILDREN WITHOUT HOMES 2 (1978);
NAT'L COMM'N ON CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS, WHO KNows? WHO CARES? FORGOT-
TEN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 6 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION
REPORT].
2. See note 15 infra.
3. I use the term "foster care" to refer to any type of 24-hour care where the child has
been transferred outside his parents' home and into the child welfare system as a result of
either court order or voluntary placement. "Foster care" includes placements in relative or
nonrelative foster homes, group homes, and other residential placements.
4. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 483 (1978) (57% of the
children still in foster care at the end of a 5-year study were not receiving visits from their
parents); set also A. GRUBER, FOSTER HOME CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS 48 (1973); E. SHER-
MAN, R. NEUMAN & A. SHYNE, CHILDREN ADRIFT IN FOSTER CARE: A STUDY OF ALTER-
NATIVE APPROACHES 32 (1973); Festinger, The New York Court Review of Children in Foster Care,
54 CHILD WELFARE 211, 241 (1975); cf notes 30-34 infia and accompanying text (describing
agency practices that discourage parent-child contacts).
5. See J. KNrrZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 187 (of national sample of foster chil-
dren, 38% had moved once or twice and 18% had moved more than twice since placement).
For additional studies in various locations, see A. EMLEN, J. LAHTI, G. DOWNS, A. McKAY &
S. DOWNS, OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO PLANNING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 18
(DHEW Publ. No. 78-30138 (1978)) [hereinafter cited as A. EMLEN]; H. MAAS & R. ENGLER,
CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS 422 (1959); Fanshel, Status Changes of Children in Foster Care:
Final Results of the Columbia University Longitudinal Stud, 55 CHILD WELFARE 143, 164 (1976).
For state-by-state estimates of the average number of placements per foster child, see NA-
TIONAL COMMISION REPORT, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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the past few years from both legal and child care experts.' Relying
on studies showing that the loss or absence of a continuous, perma-
nent relationship with a parental figure is associated with higher
rates of juvenile delinquency and psychological disturbance,7 child
care experts have called for changes in child welfare law and practice
to ensure that children have the opportunity to form and maintain
such relationships.8 Some commentators have even suggested that
the child has a constitutional right to a permanent home. 9
Over the last ten years, a consensus has evolved, not only as to the
goal of "permanency," but also as to the outline of a reform program
to achieve this goal.10 The main thrust of this program is to move as
many children as possible out of foster care."' Accordingly, the new
"permanency program" would generally permit termination of the
rights of a natural parent whose child has been placed in foster care if
the parent is unable to regain custody within a fixed time after place-
ment. Following termination-the effect of which is to deprive the
6. See, e.g., sources cited in note 5 supra; sources cited in note 8 infra. For a discussion of
the foster care practices that cause foster care drift, see notes 18-43 infra and accompanying
text.
7. For a discussion of these studies, see notes 155-68 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (2d ed 1981) [hereinafter cited as GFS I]; Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best
Interest?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected"
Children: Standardsfor Removal of Children in Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster
Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Muench & Levy, Pychological Parentage.- A Natural Right 13 FAM. L.Q. 129
(1979); Musewicz, The Failure of Foster Care: Federal Statutog Reform and The Child's Right to
Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 661-78 (1981); cf. Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for
Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 347 (1972) ("A child. . . should have a legal right... [t]o receive
parental love and affection, discipline and guidance, and to grow to maturity in a home
which enables him to develop into a mature and responsible adult."). To date, the Supreme
Court has failed to recognize such a right. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816 (1977). Most lower federal courts also have held that neither children nor foster
parents have protectible liberty or property interests in a child's placement. See, e.g., Sherrard
v. Owens, 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981); Kyees v. County Dept. of
Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family &
Children's Serv., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Child v.
Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir.
1982) (foster mother who was half-sister to foster children has liberty interest in their contin-
ued placement with her); Timmy S. v. Stumbo, 537 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (state-
certified foster parents have property interest in that certification).
10. A. EMLEN, supra note 5, at 9; GFS I, supra note 8, at 31-49, 99; See, e.g., NATIONAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5; T.J. STEIN, E.D. GAMBRILL & K.T. WILTSE, CHIL-
DREN IN FOSTER CARE: ACHIEVING CONTINUITY OF CARE 43 (1978); Mnookin,supra note 8,
at 633-35; Wald, supra note 8, at 700-06.
11. For a general description of the permanency program, see notes 87-108 infla and
accompanying text.
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parent of both the right ever to regain custody and the right to exer-
cise visitation privileges 2 -the child would be "freed" from foster
care for placement in an adoptive home.
This program would effect a significant change in child welfare
law, which has traditionally required a showing of parental fault as a
precondition to termination." Permanency program advocates have
justified this change primarily on the basis of the child's need for
permanence. As long tefm foster care usually does not meet that
need, they assert, it is necessary to free the child for adoption, and
hence a permanent home, by terminating the rights of his parents.
It is the thesis of this article that, while the child's need for per-
manence may justify depriving his parent of the right to regain cus-
tody, it does not justify terminating parental visitation rights.1 4 To
the contrary, I submit that termination of these rights is not only
unnecessary to provide foster children with permanent homes, but it
may indeed prove damaging for many children. The available evi-
dence suggests that, even for a child who will never again live with
his natural parents and whose contacts with them are infrequent,
permanent placement that permits continued contact is better than
adoption or any other placement that entails a total loss of contact
with the natural parent. Moreover, since termination does not guar-
antee placement in a permanent home, looser termination standards
alone cannot ensure that children will escape the limbo status of fos-
ter care. Nor will increased use of termination improve the quality
or stability of foster care placements. In light of these considerations,
I suggest a new standard for termination of parental visitation rights:
Termination of these rights should be ordered only after a judicial
finding that the child will otherwise suffer specific, significant harm
and that any alternative short of termination will not avert that
harm.
12. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-53 (1982) (a termination order terminates all the
parent's rights and obligations with respect to the child); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-209 (1978)
(the court may terminate "all parental rights" where parents are unfit or unable to care for
the child).
13. Traditionally, the most frequent grounds for termination have been abandonment,
neglect, and parental unfitness. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9
FAM. L.Q. 1, 56, 66-67 (1975).
14. All too often, courts and commentators have treated a permanent loss of custody
and the termination of other parental rights as identical issues, which they are not. If a
parent loses custody, he may not have the child live with him. If all parental rights are
terminated, he has no right ever to see or visit the child again. To avoid confusion, I assume
throughout this article that the hypothetical parent whose rights the state threatens to termi-
nate has already been permanently deprived of custody of his child.
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Part I of this article describes the problem of "foster care drift"
and the reasons for its development. Part II describes the new per-
manency program which has been proposed to resolve the problem
of foster care drift. Part III analyzes the arguments used to support
the permanency program's position on termination of parental
rights. Finally, Part IV proposes new standards to govern termina-
tion of parental visitation rights.
I. THE PROBLEM: FOSTER CARE DRIFr
The problem that the permanency program seeks to resolve is
now generally described as "foster care drift." Drift occurs when
children in placement lose contact with their natural parents and fail
to form any significant relationship with a parental substitute. Drift
is indeed a pervasive problem among children in foster care. Once a
child enters foster care, he has about a 50% chance of remaining
there for at least two years;' 5 the longer he remains in care, the more
likely he is to lose contact with his natural parents' 6 and to change
foster homes.'
7
A. Foster Care Practices that Produce Drft
A child enters foster care through one of two routes: Either a
complaint is made about the child's family, or the family itself re-
quests assistance. Following a complaint or request for assistance, a
state agency investigates the family. After the investigation, the
15. The House Ways and Means Committee recently reported that 48% of foster chil-
dren spend more than 21/2 years in care. H.R. REP. No. 136, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 46 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 136]. Professor Michael Wald has stated that "[t]here is
probably a 50% chance that a child will remain in foster care for three years or more." Wald,
supra note 8, at 626-27; see also A. GRUBER, supra note 4, at 16-18 (in 1971, mean foster care
placement in Massachusets was just under five years); J. KNrrZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1,
at 6 (in 1975, 52% of national sample had been in foster care for two or more years).
The time children remain in foster care may, however, be decreasing. Compare Maas,
Children in Long Term Poster Care, 48 CHILD WELFARE 321, 321-23 (1969) (of 422 children who
entered foster care in 1957 in 8 counties across the nation, 31% were in care for ten or more
years, 52% for six or more years, and only 24% for three years or less) with Fanshel, supra note
5, at 145, 148 (of 624 New York City children who entered foster care in 1966 and remained
in care for at least 90 days, 56% had been returned to their parents 5 years later, and about
37% went home within two years).
16. See, e.g., D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at 88-89 (percentage of unvisited
children rose from 18% after six to nine months in foster care to 57% at the end of five years).
17. See, e.g., id at 139-40 (80% of children discharged within one year had only one
placement, but only 16% of children still in foster care after five years had only one
placement).
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agency may decide to drop the case, file a neglect petition in court,1 8
or work out a voluntary foster care arrangement. 19
Children enter foster care for extremely varied reasons. The most
common are a parent's mental or physical illness, child neglect or
abuse, abandonment, parental inability to provide child care, and
child behavior problems.20 But whatever the reason for placement,
when a child enters foster care, his parent is required to cede legal
custody-the right to decide where the child lives and the kind of
day-to-day care he receives2 '-to the state's child welfare system.22 A
18. Generally, a court may order foster placement upon finding that the child's natural
parent has abused, abandoned, or neglected him. For a description of typical standards
within each category, see Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 13. In recent years, commenta-
tors have frequently criticized traditional neglect standards as being too vague to prevent
arbitrary decisionmaking. See, e.g., Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1000-04 (1975).
19. Some "voluntary" placements simply reflect parental inability to obtain any other
form of help. See note 49 infia and accompanying text. Others represent a kind of plea bar-
gain, in which the parent agrees to placement in order to avoid the initiation of neglect
proceedings. See Mnookin, supra note 8, at 601.
The proportion of placements that states classify as voluntary varies wildly from state to
state, ranging from 2.0% to 95% in one recent national survey. NATIONAL COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 32-33. This variation may be partly due to the fact that, until recently,
federal foster care reimbursement was only available in cases of court-ordered foster care. See
42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (1974). Agencies in some jurisdictions may bringproforma court actions
to satisfy the reimbursement requirement. Thus, under The Child Welfare Act of 1980, vol-
untary foster care placements made in accordance with federal requirements are eligible for
matching federal funds until Sept. 1, 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
20. Because a child may enter foster care for several reasons and because agencies clas-
sify these reasons in neither a uniform nor a reliable manner, placement statistics provide only
a fuzzy picture of the reasons children enter foster care. One study, however, invested consid-
erable effort in developing a reliable procedure for identifying the main reason for any given
placement. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at 45-51. It determined that the
placements it looked at were due to mental illness of the child-caring person (21.9%), neglect
or abuse (14.6%), child behavior problems (11.7%), physical illness of the child-caring person
(10.9%), abandonment (10.7%), a parent's unwillingness or inability to continue care (10.1o),
a parent's unwillingness or inability to assume care (8.8%), other family problems (9. 1%), and
parental death (2.2%). Id at 46. Other studies paint a similar picture. See A. GRUBER, supra
note 4, at 15; E. SHERMAN, R. NEUMAN & A. SHYNE, supra note 4, at 26.
21. Legal custody includes the "right to the care, custody [and] control . . . of [the
child] . . . [and] the duty to . . . provide food, clothing, training, shelter, medical care and
education . . . ." CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR FOSTER FAM-
ILY SERVICES 21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CWLA STANDARDS]. Custody of the child usu-
ally does not entitle the agency to consent to major surgery or marriage. Id at 22.
22. See, e.g., N.Y. SOc. SERV. LAW § 383.2 (McKinney 1976) (" custody of a [foster]
child . . . shall be vested . . . in the authorized agency placing out or boarding out such
child, and any such authorized agency may in its discretion remove such child from the home
where placed or boarded").
Once the parent has surrendered custody, typically he may not obtain the return of the
child without agency or court approval. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.
1977) (mother who voluntarily placed her child when she was hospitalized spent years at-
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state-authorized foster care agency then determines the type of care
the child will receive as well as his particular placement.
In theory, foster placement is a temporary period during which
the state will provide the child and parent with services designed to
resolve the problems that forced their separation.23 Typically, how-
ever, agencies do little to help parents regain custody of their chil-
dren. The family problems that necessitated removal usually receive
only perfunctory agency attention.24 In most cases, the agency
caseworker contacts the natural parent infrequently 25 and does not
follow up referrals of the parent to other agencies.26 Even when the
agency tries to work with the family, it often assigns one caseworker
to the child and another to the parents, with little or no communica-
tion between the two.27 Contacts between agency and parent also
tend to decrease markedly after the first year of placement,28 and
tempting to regain custody, even though there had been no adjudication of neglect); In re
Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 391 N.E. 2d 1316, 418 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1979) (mother who had
voluntarily placed child to complete education, contributed to child support, and visited reg-
ularly was unable to regain custody for nine years). Apparently, in some states, a voluntary
surrender legally transfers only physical custody of the child, see CWLA STANDARDS, supra
note 21, at 48, but agencies often have not honored parents' requests for a child's return. See
Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystifxcation of the Child Protection Sstem, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. l, 24
n.129 (1973).
In recent years there has been some movement toward permitting voluntary placement
for a definite term, at the end of which the agency must relinquish custody. See, e.g., N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
23. See CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 8-13; A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE
SERVICES 314 (3d ed. 1980).
24. Agencies offer few parents any help while their children are in foster care. For ex-
ample, an Arizona survey found that 56% of mothers of foster children were offered no serv-
ices during placement. S. VASALY, FOSTER CARE IN FIVE STATES 34 (1976). See generall J.
KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 24-25 (parental problems are "widely ignored").
One reason why natural parents receive so little assistance is that agencies typically give
them lowest priority when allocating resources and manpower. See D. SHAPIRO, AGENCIES
AND FOSTER CHILDREN 20 (1976) (proportion of child care workers responsible for work with
the natural family was 14% in year one of survey and 3% in year five).
25. Surveys uniformly show infrequent contacts between agencies and parents. See, e.g.,
S. VASALY, supra note 24, at 32 (in Iowa, 65%, and in Massachusetts, 60%, of the mothers
surveyed had no known contact with the agency within six months or more of their child's
placement); COMPTROLLER GEN., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
INSTITUTIONS-STEPS GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE TO IMPROVE THEIR CARE 11
(HRD-77-40) (1977) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT] (over 40% of parents surveyed re-
ceived no visit by agency within first six months of child's placement). This is especially
disconcerting in light of evidence that frequency of contact between caseworker, parent, and
child appreciably increases the likelihood that the child will return home during the first year
of placement. See D. SHAPIRO, sufira note 24, at 89.
26. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 24-25.
27. See id at 24.
28. D. SHAPIRO, supra note 24, at 73-75.
February 1983] PARENTAL RIGHTS
services necessary to enable the child's return home are rarely made
available.29
Moreover, agencies often discourage parents from maintaining
ties with their children. Agencies seldom involve natural parents in
decisionmaking regarding their children's care.30 And they fre-
quently frustrate parental contact with the child3 by, for example,
placing children in locations which make parental visitation diffi-
cult,32 allowing visits only at agency offices under the eye of a social
worker,33 and inflexibly restricting visiting hours.34
Nor do agencies act to ensure the formation of a stable relation-
ship between the child and the foster parent. Agencies haphazardly
"match" children and foster parents35 and rarely provide foster par-
29. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 26; NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note I, at 16.
30. See A. GRUBER, supra note 4, at 47; J. KNITzER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 23-24;
E. SHERMAN, R. NEUMAN & A. SHYNE, supra note 4, at 4-5. For a description of a project
that successfully increased parental involvement in foster care decisionmaking, see Simmons,
Gumpert & Rothman, Natural Parents as Partners in Child Placement, 54 Soc. CASEWORK 224
(1973).
31. In a Massachusetts survey, 37.5% of parents who indicated that they did not see
their children enough (60% of total) reported that their agency social worker had told them
that visiting their child was inappropriate. A. GRUBER, sup-a note 4, at 49, 78; see also J.
KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 22-24; S. VASALY, supra note 24, at 33-35.
These practices are particularly troublesome, given that the existence and frequency of
parental visitation are key factors in determining whether a child will be reunited with his
family, D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at 85-111, 483-90, and in improving his emo-
tional well-being. See notes 169-202 infra and accompanying text.
32. See J. KNrTZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 22-23 & n.30 (9% of children in
out-of-home care placed in a county other than parent's residence; 40% of San Francisco
foster care placements in another county); Festinger, supra note 4, at 241 (70% of New York
City foster care placements in a borough other than parent's residence); see also H.R. REP.
No. 136,supra note 15, at 48-49. Agencies sometimes even place children out-of-state. See J.
KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 57-74. At least one court has held that parents need
not be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before such a placement. See Sinhogar v.
Parry, 53 N.Y.2d 424, 425 N.E.2d 826, 442 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1981) (post-placement administra-
tive hearings satisfy requirements of due process).
33. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 22 (citing national survey).
34. According to one national survey:
[Visiting] policies.. . were often restrictive, impl ying that the majority ofparents could not be
trusted with their children In one survey county, children were allowed visits from
their parents "on birthdays and other special occasions." In another, visits were
held in the courtroom-hardly a setting to elicit spontaneous interactions between
parents and their children. A parent whose child entered foster care when her mar-
riage was dissolving was told she could visit once a month, but a soft-hearted foster
mother allowed her to visit once a week. Elsewhere, parents were not permitted
evening visits. Some places required that caseworkers be present.
J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 22.
35. According to a Massachusetts survey, only 36% of foster parents had met the child
prior to placement, and of those foster parents who received a child with disabilities, only 25%
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ent training. 6 As a result, some children must be moved because
their placements do not work out or because the foster parents re-
quest removal. And even when a haphazard match does work, agen-
cies have sometimes removed children from homes in which
(according to the agency) the foster parents have grown "too at-
tached" to the child.37
Even when it is apparent that a foster child will never return to
his parents' custody,38 foster care agencies generally have not sought
a more stable placement. In such a case, an agency could either
enter into a permanent care arrangement with the foster parents39 or
were aware of the child's special needs. A. GRUBER, supra note 4, at 79-80; see also S. VASALY,
supra note 24, at 97-99. This carelessness or lack of concern leads agencies to inappropriately
place many children. See, e.g., B. BERNSTEIN, D. SNIDER & W. MEEZAN, A PRELIMINARY
REPORT: FOSTER CARE NEEDS AND ALTERNATIVES TO PLACEMENT: A PROJECTION FOR
1975-1985, at 13-17 (1975) (more than one-half of the children studied had been inappropri-
ately placed initially, and more than two-fifths were inappropriately placed at the time of the
study); see also S. JENKINS & E. NORMAN, FILIAL DEPRIVATION AND FOSTER CARE 5 (1972);
J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 45-47.
36. See S. VASALY, supra note 24, at 97-98 (in Arizona, only 12% of foster parents sur-
veyed received preplacement training, and only 21% received a preplacement visit from a
social worker; in Massachusetts, less than 25% of foster parents surveyed received preplace-
ment training, and frequently the only preplacement agency contact was a phone call to
inquire into available space). See generaly NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at
17 (foster parents tend to be overworked, underpaid, and inadequately prepared).
37. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wallace v. Lhotan, 51 A.D.2d 252, 259, 380 N.Y.S.2d 250, 256
(1976) (foster children removed from "well meaning" foster parents who "because of their
love for the girls" encouraged a negative attitude toward natural mother), appeal dismissed, 39
N.Y.2d 743, 389 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1976);In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 9 Misc. 2d 402, 403, 172
N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (1957) (upholding agency decision to remove five and one-half year-old
child from foster parents who had cared for her from birth because they had "become fond of
the child to an extent which has resulted in an attempt by them to. . . adopt. . . her"), aj'd,
5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959).
The practice of removing foster children from overly devoted foster parents has been
greatly criticized in recent years. See, e.g., GFS I, supra note 8, at 35-38, 71-111; Katz, Foster
Parents versus Agencies.- A Case Study in the Judicial Application of the 'Best Interests of the Child"
Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 145 (1966).
38. Available data show that foster children return home, if at all, at widely varying
rates. See M. BURT & L. BLAIR, OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE CARE OF NEGLECTED AND
DEPENDENT CHILDREN 80-82 (1971) (of Nashville children who were placed by court order
because of parental neglect, 13% returned home within 18 months); D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN,
supra note 4, at 115 (56.1% of New York City foster children were discharged from care before
the end of five years); Wiltse, Current Issues and New Directions in Foster Care, in OFFICE OF
HUMAN DEV. SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PUB. No. 78-30158,
CHILD WELFARE STRATEGY IN THE COMING YEARS 76 (1978) (20% of placed children re-
turned home in San Francisco and New York City, and 25% in Monterey County). Method-
ological defects make comparisons or interpretation of available return data difficult. See
Wald, supra note 8, at 662 n.158.
39. For a description of possible permanent care arrangements, see notes 100-07 infa
and accompanying text.
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petition the courts to terminate parental rights-the permanency
program approach to ensuring stability-in order to free the child for
adoption. Neither course of action has been frequently pursued. 4°
The infrequency with which permanent homes have been sought
cannot be explained by the fact that traditional termination stan-
dards impose heavy evidentiary burdens on agencies. 4' Even chil-
dren whose parents have consented to their adoption often remain in
foster care,42 and permanent care arrangements with foster parents
do not, of course, even require termination of parental rights.
For many children, the net result of foster care practice is foster
care drift.4 3 Upon entering foster care, these children can expect
long term, temporary placements and the absence of any signficant,
ongoing parental relationship.
B. The Origins of Foster Care Practices that Produce Drzft:. An Historical
Perspective
Foster care practices that produce drift-discouraging the child's
maintenance of ties with his natural family, encouraging long term
placement, and making difficult the development of substitute pa-
40. "[L]ong term plans that would provide. .. [foster] children with a sense of security
and stability are seldom made and rarely implemented." Mnookin, supra note 8, at 612. On
agencies' failure to seek adoptive homes, see J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 187 (in
a recent national survey, in which 33% of the children had been in care at least four years,
only 4% of the foster care cases were in adoptive homes; in every county visited, termination
of parental rights was infrequent); see also D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at 131 (only
4.6% of New York City foster children studied were adopted at the end of a 5-year period); E.
SHERMAN, R. NEUMAN & A. SHYNE, supra note 4, at 51 (one out of 413 foster children
adopted by end of 2-year study). See generall.y Wald, supra note 8 (termination has been uti-
lized infrequently).
41. Examples of typical termination standards can be found in Katz, Howe & Mc-
Grath, supra note 13, at 68.
42. One New York City study reported that, although many people try to adopt older
children, minority children, and children with various "handicaps," agencies frequently reject
or discourage these attempts for questionable reasons. NEw YORK CITY COMPTROLLER'S
OFFIcE, THE CHILDREN ARE WAITING 26-29 (1977). See J. KNITZER AND M. ALLEN, supra
note 1, at 30-32 (agencies often fail to identify adoptive children or to complete adoption
proceedings).
43. Traditionally, children injured as a result of inadequate foster care services have
had inadequate legal remedies. See Note, A Damages Remedy for Abuses by Child Protection Work-
ers, 90 YALE LJ. 657, 694-96 (1981). One federal court has held that government officials
may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for failure to adequately supervise a foster
home placement, see Doe v. New York Dept. of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), and
several state courts have recently permitted damages actions by foster children for improper
home supervision, see, e.g., Bradford v. Davis, 290 Or. 855, 626 P.2d 1376 (1981) (action not
barred by statute of limitations or sovereign immunity); National Bank [of South Dakota] v.
Leir, 325 N.W.2d 304 (S.D. 1982) (action not barred by sovereign immunity); see also Annot.,
90 A.L.R.3d 1214 (1979).
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rental relationships-are deeply entrenched within the child welfare
system. Thus, drift is not amenable to any easy solution. Providing
more money, more workers, or lighter caseloads, for example, would
be unlikely to have any major impact on agency performance. Foster
care is indeed poorly funded and staffed,'" but agency attitudes and
priorities dictating that available resources will not be allocated to-
ward its reduction are a more important factor in-producing drift.45
These attitudes and priorities derive from the child welfare system's
history and the conflicting goals which that history has produced.
Understanding the problem of foster care drift-and the possibilities
for its solution-therefore requires some understanding of the devel-
opment of child welfare tradition.
1. Discouraging ties with natural parents.
The foster care system's lack of concern for natural parents re-
flects centuries of a dual family law-one for the rich and one for the
poor. In practice, foster care is basically a form of welfare. A few
statistics make this clear: Fewer than 20% of all children who do not
live with either natural parent are in foster care,46 but 60-80% of the
children in foster care come from families receiving public assist-
ance,47 and almost all come from the bottom rung of the economic
44. In some states, caseloads of 70 to 90 per worker are typical. NATIONAL CONINIIS-
SION REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. Also, high turnover rates among foster care workers mean
that foster parents and children often have to deal with several different caseworkers; for
example, one study found that only 16% of the cases studied had been assigned to the same
worker for more than two years. A. GRUBER, supra note 4, at 26, 38; see also NATIONAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, 8-9, 36-37; D. SHAPIRO, supra note 24, at 22; Freu-
denberger, Bum-out: Occupational Hazard of the Child Care Worker, 6 CHILD CARE Q. 90 (1977).
Workers are often inexperienced and poorly trained. See D. SHAPIRO, supra note 24, at
19-20 (46% of child care workers surveyed had only a B.A. degree; their median experience
was two years); Campbell, The Neglected Child.- His and His Family's Treatment Under Massachusetts
Law and Practice and Their Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 631, 642
(1970) (most Massachusetts child care workers had only B.A. degrees, often in fields other
than psychology or social work).
45. For example, one recent study discovered that only 10% of child care workers were
assigned to natural families, while 27% were responsible for admission procedures or supervi-
sory responsibilities. D. SHAPIRO, supra note 24, at 20.
46. See Rein, Nutt & Weiss, Foster Famiy Care: Myth and Reality, in CHILDREN & DECENT
PEOPLE 24, 26 (A. Schorr ed. 1974).
47. One New York City foster care study found that, in 1966, two-thirds of the sample
families had incomes at or below the poverty line and that 52%, compared to 7.9% of the
general New York City population, received public assistance. S. JENKINS & E. NORMAN,
supra note 35, at 25-29. A later New York City study showed even higher percentages of
families of foster children receiving public assistance. Festinger, supra note 4, at 227 (in 1977,
62.9% of sample mothers received welfare). An Oregon Study, conducted between 1973 and
1976, reported similar results. A. EMLEN, supra note 5, at 19 (76% of mothers surveyed had
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ladder.4" The explanation for this phenomenon is simply that mid-
dle and upper income families can obtain substitute care at the home
of a friend or relative or at a boarding school, or they can employ
services, such as day care or housekeeping assistance, that obviate the
need for child care outside the home. But for the marginal family
that cannot obtain such private services, public child care-foster
care placement-is usually the only alternative.4 0
The present foster care system is thus part of what Jacobus ten-
Broek has aptly termed the "family law of the poor,"50 a direct de-
"always or usually" received public assistance); see also Boehm, The Child in Foster Care, in
FOSTER CARE IN QUESTION: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT BY TWENTY-ONE EXPERTS 220-27
(H. Stone ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as FOSTER CARE IN QUESTION].
48. "It is the marginal family, whose characteristics and social circumstances are such
that it cannot sustain further stress, which utilizes the placement system as a last resort when
its own fragile supports break down." S. JENKINS & E. NORMAN, supra note 35, at 19. One
recent foster care case study found that 83% of natural mothers and 85% of natural fathers
had not gone to school past the eighth grade, that only 8% of the mothers, 31% of the biologi-
cal fathers, and 44% of the legal fathers reported "having had steady [or consistent] employ-
ment," and that 8% of the mothers and 10% of the fathers were hospitalized or incarcerated.
A. EMLEN, supra note 5, at 19; see also CWLA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 3; S. VASALY,
supra note 24, at 21.
49. In most communities, the child welfare system offers few, if any, alternatives to fos-
ter care. For example, in early 1976, Los Angeles County, with its population of seven mil-
lion. had only 61 "homemakers" to provide housekeeping and child care assistance to families
in their own homes; San Francisco had nine homemakers, but they were available only on an
8-to-5 o'clock basis and only if there was a parent at home. J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra
note 1, at 16-17. Gruber reported that, in Massachusetts, social workers almost never consid-
ered options which might have obviated the need for foster care: They discussed enlisting
homemakers in about 3% of the cases even though 16.7% of the parents surveyed felt that a
homemaker could have averted foster care, and they discussed using day care in less than 2%
of the cases even though 28.8% of the parents surveyed felt that day care could have averted
foster care. A. GRUBER, supra note 4, at 46-47; cf S. VASALY, supra note 24, at 24 (an Arizona
survey found that 51% of mothers and 30% of fathers were offered services prior to place-
ment).
In many cases, however, in-home services could prevent the need for foster care. See, e.g.,
BOSTON CHILDREN'S SERV. ASS'N, TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES PROJECT ANNUAL REPORT
(undated), cited in J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 17 & n.10 (69% of the children
whose families received preventive services-the experimental group-remained in their
homes, compared to 24% of the control group); M. JONES, R. NEUMAN & A. SHYNE, A SEC-
OND CHANCE FOR FAMILIES: EVALUATION OF A PROGRAM TO REDUCE FOSTER CARE 102
(1976) (A New York preventive services demonstration project dramatically reduced foster
care placements: At the end of eighteen months, 92% of the children in the experimental
group remained at home, compared to 77% of the control group); see also J. KNITLER & M.
ALLEN, supra note 1, at 15-18; NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
50. tenBroek, Caiformia's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present
Status, Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 262 (1964); see also Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 231-40, 248 (1975)
(differentiating private family law-divorce custody cases-from public family law--child
neglect cases-in that the former involve primarily "private dispute settlement" while the
latter involve "child protection").
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scendant of the Elizabethan poor law5' and successive welfare
schemes administering public aid to children who are destitute or
otherwise deprived of parental care. This public family law has sel-
dom deferred to parental rights.5 2 The doctrine of parental rights
descends instead from common law inheritance and property con-
cepts which developed to resolve private disputes," and it has largely
remained so confined. Thus, as between a parent and another pri-
vate individual, courts have generally recognized superior parental
rights to the custody and control of children,54 but under the family
law of the poor, courts have routinely ordered parents to cede cus-
tody to the state without any showing of fault.
Under the Colonial American poor laws, indigent parents who
could not support their children simply lost custody of them; the chil-
dren were indentured as apprentices on such terms and to such par-
ties as the local authorities prescribed.5 Independence did not
51. Under the Elizabethan poor law public authorities bound out as apprentices aban-
doned or orphaned children without responsible relatives and children "whose parents shall
not. . . be thought able to keep and maintain [them]." 43 Eliz. 1, ch.2, §§ I, V (1601). For a
discussion of the origins and operation of the poor law, see tenBroek, supra note 50, at 258-91.
52. "For the poor, state intervention between parent and child was not only permitted
but encouraged in order to effectuate a number of public policies, ranging from the provision
of relief at minimum cost to the prevention of future crime. For all others, the state would
separate children from parents only in the most extreme circumstances, and then only when
private parties initiated court action." Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child- A Reappraisal
of the State's Role in Child Neglect andAbuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887, 899 (1975); see also tenBroek,
supra note 50.
53. The parental rights doctrine is ultimately traceable to the feudal era. The most
important "family law" rules during this era governed wardship-the right to be the guard-
ian-of a minor heir. These rules entitled the father of the heir to be his guardian; on the
father's death, this right passed to the lord of the infant's lands rather than to the heir's
mother. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 544-45 (5th ed.
1956); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I 319 (2d ed. 1899, reissued 1968); tenBroek, supra note 50, at 287-88.
Apparently, the law regulating master and servant relations governed parental rights
over children who were not heirs. Thus, Blackstone remarked that a father "may indeed have
the benefit of his children's labor while they live with him, and are maintained by him: but
this is no more than he is entitled to from his apprentices or servants." 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *453; see also T. PLUCKETT, supra, at 545; tenBroek, supra note 50, at 287-90.
54. Parental rights "may be limited or interfered with only for the most substantial,
compelling and sufficient reasons. Only the most unusual of circumstances warrant refusal of
custody to a parent in favor of any other relative" or person. 67A C.J.S. Parent &Child §§ 16,
18 (1978). Even when courts have found compelling grounds to grant custody to a private
individual over the claim of the natural parent, they have typically preserved visitation and
ancillary parental privileges. See, e.g., Jackson v. Russell, 342 Ill. App. 637, 97 N.E.2d 584
(1951) ("rights of natural parents to their children cannot be terminated unless clear and
convincing case is made out"); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976); Wrecsics v. Broughton, 285 Pa. Super. 90, 426 A.2d 1155 (1981).
55. For example, the Massachusetts statute provided that:
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change these practices; throughout the first half of the nineteenth
century, the state removed children from their parents' custody solely
because of the parents' poverty.5 6 During this period, the poor house
and various children's institutions supplemented indenture as meth-
ods of caring for children who had been removed from their parents'
custody. But in neither type of placement was any effort made to
maintain the parent-child relationship. 7
In the second half of the nineteenth century, neglect officially re-
placed poverty as the legal basis for depriving parents of custody of
their children, but for the most part, poverty was simply equated
with neglect.58 To the child savers of the era, the "simple dictate of
humanity [was] . . . to rescue the child from. . . its contaminating
[T]he Overseers of the Poor in any Town or District where such Officers are chosen,
otherwise the Selectmen or the Major part of them, are hereby fully Authorized &
Impowered by and with the Assent of two Justices of the Peace, to set to work, or
bind out Apprentice, all such Children, whose parents shall in their opinion be un-
able to maintain them (whether they receive alms, or are chargeable to the Town or
District or not) . . . Male Children until they arrive to the age of twenty-one years,
and Females to the age of Eighteen, unless such females are sooner married, which
binding shall be as good and effectual in Law to every intent & purpose, as if such
Child being of full Age, had by Deed or Indenture bound himself.
An Act for the Support of the Poor (1781), ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSErS 1788-89, at 99 (1894), quoted in I CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 265
(R. Bremner ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as CHILDREN AND YOUTH]. For other colonial stat-
utes and additional materials on indenture, see 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra, at 262-67.
The New England colonies supplemented apprenticeship with the "vendue system," under
which the poor were "sold" to the lowest bidder. These provisions for children mirrored those
for adult relief recipients, who were similarly assigned to compulsory labor. See 1 CHILDREN
AND YOUTH, supra, at 103-04, 267-70. See also Areen, supra note 52, at 899-9 10; Riesenfeld,
The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 175, 201-33 (1955);
tenBroek, supra note 50, at 291-305.
56. Some statutes authorized the separation of neglected, as well as poor, children from
their parents. See, e.g., VI STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 32 (W. Hening ed. 1819), quoted
in I CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 263. But authorities apparently understood
that only the children of the poor were to be taken by the state. Areen, supra note 52, at 900.
57. Nineteenth century commentary on methods and problems in the care of children
in state custody rarely mentioned natural parents. For representative examples of such com-
mentary, see 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH; supra note 55, at 247-330, 338-47. When the nine-
teenth century commentary did mention natural parents, the tone was almost invariably
negative. See, e.g., BOSTON SPECIAL COMM. TO INSPECT PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, CITY Doc.
No. 122, FINAL REPORT 46-48 (1892), quoted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at
269 ("It may surely be questioned whether justice to the [institutionalized] children should
not shut some parents away from this privilege of visiting them.").
58. See, e.g., Field, The Child and the State, I FORUM 106-09 (1886), quoted in 2 CHILDREN
AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 205. Records of the New York Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children reflect the equation of poverty with neglect. During the Society's first ten
months of operation, it brought 72 "cruelty" cases to court; in over forty of them, the Society
responded to poverty, whereas only 20 involved any form of child abuse. A considerable
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surroundings" 59-- or, in short, to rescue him from his parents. Ad-
ministrators of the foster care system, which originated during this
"rescue" era, still made no effort to encourage the maintenance of a
rescued child's relationship with his natural parents.
60
Centuries of tradition die hard. Thus, while official attitudes to-
ward parents have changed, neglect proceedings are still brought al-
most exclusively against poor parents,6 ' and, neglectful or not, poor
parents still must almost invariably relinquish legal custody of their
child to obtain a foster care placement.6 2 The failure of today's foster
care system to encourage parent-child contact or'involve the parents
number involved organ grinders who used children in their begging routines. See Areen, supra
note 52, at 903 n.94 (describing the Society's first annual report).
Nineteenth century neglect statutes made the same connection between poverty and ne-
glect. For example, the Massachusetts neglect law provided that:
Whenever. . .any child under fourteen years of age, by reason of orphanage,
or of the neglect, crime, drunkenness or other vice of his parents, is growing up
without education or salutory control, and in circumstances exposing him to lead an
idle and dissolute life, or is dependent upon public charity, [he should be] . ..com-
mit[ted]. . . to [state] custody. . . until he arrives at the age of twenty-one years or
for any less time.
An Act Relating to Indigent and Neglected Children, ch.181, 1882 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF
MASSACHUSETTS 135 (emphasis added). Many modern state neglect statutes still equate pov-
erty with neglect. See note 61 infa.
59. Field, supra note 58, at 205-06. For a general discussion of the child rescue move-
ment, see J. AXINN & H. LEVIN, SOCIAL WELFARE; A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RE-
SPONSE TO NEED 94-97 (1975); W. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE
93-113 (2d ed. 1979).
60. During this era, writers focused on the advantages of "boarding out"--as foster care
was then called--over institutional care, on whether the availability of payments to foster
families would reduce the number of families willing to board a child for free, and on
problems in home selection and supervision; they never expressed concern about maintaining
the child's relationship with his natural parents. For representative examples of the com-
mentary of this era, see 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 322-30, 338-47. The
prevalent belief was that early exposure to poor parents produced future generations of pau-
pers; thus, continued exposure to their parents was deemed to be harmful to these children's
development. See J. AXINN & LEVIN, supra note 59, at 95-97; see also note 57 supra.
61. A 1975 survey reported six jurisdictions which made "begging or receiving alms"
and 26 jurisdictions which made "associatfion] with vagrant, vicious or immoral people and/
or environment, and associations injurious to the health, safety or morals of the child"
grounds for finding neglect. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, supra note 13, at 25 (table IV).
Available information indicates that the poor have been vastly overrepresented among
court findings of neglect. For example, a 1964 study in Minnesota found that 42% of parents
that courts had found neglected their children were receiving public assistance, compared to
just 3% of the general population. See Boehm, The Community and Social Agenty Defane Neglect,
43 CHILD WELFARE 453, 459 (1964); see also Kay & Philips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 717, 735 (1966) ("substantial" numbers of children referred to California
probation departments as dependent or neglected come from families receiving AFDC).
Class biases may also lead child welfare agencies to remove children from poor homes without
adequate investigation. Id at 736-37.
62. See note 22 supra.
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in planning for their child is thus deeply rooted in the poor law tradi-
tions of the child welfare system.
2. Encouraging long term placements.
The same poor law heritage, coupled with administrative conven-
ience, has produced long term foster placements. From the era of the
Elizabethan poor law until the twentieth century, placement by the
child welfare system authorized the state to retain custody of a child
until his maturity.63 Although nineteenth century neglect laws left
open the possibility of restoring the child to his parents after a period
in placement, parents were "seldom able to recover their children by
showing their fitness to care for them." 4 The same attitude that en-
couraged the child's "rescue" from his natural parents discouraged
his return.
Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, indenture was the
most common method of providing long term care.65 Indenture was
popular because the child worked for his keep and thus cost the state
nothing. But during the second half of the century, changing eco-
nomic and social conditions made the indenture of very young chil-
dren increasingly difficult to obtain. 6 The child welfare system
began to employ new methods of child care.
States employed institutional placement, foster care, and adop-
tion for those children who could not be indentured. Among these
choices, adoption was the preferred means of providing for destitute
children. Adoption was preferred because, unlike indenture, it
63. For a typical nineteenth century custody statute, see note 58 supra.
64. MASSACHUSETTS SOC. FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, SEV-
ENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1887), quoted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 208.
The small possibility that a child would be restored to his parents reflected the child
welfare system's emphasis on poverty as a proxy for neglect. See notes 58-59supra and accom-
panying text. Parents could not easily escape their poverty. Today, economic status still
correlates with whether a child will rejoin his parents at home. See S. JENKINS & E. NORMAN,
BEYOND PLACEMENT: MOTHERS VIEw FOSTER CARE 30-31 (1975).
65. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
66. For various reasons the age at which the children were bound out tended to rise
and consequently the period during which the community continued to be responsi-
ble for their care lengthened. Whereas in the seventeenth and early eighteenth cen-
tury it had been customary to bind the children to masters when they were barely
out of infancy, the newer tendency was to maintain them as public charges until
they reached the age of eight, ten or twelve.
1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 262; see also Presser, The Historical Background of the
American Laws ofAdoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 477-78 (1971) ("By the 1840's it had become apparent
• ..that the. . . institution of 'putting out' for service. . .[was] becoming obsolete.").
67. Before the second half of the nineteenth century, all jurisdictions except Texas and
Louisiana-which followed civil law-adhered to the English common law, which did not
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obliged someone other than the state to pay for the child's keep.68
Child welfare advocates of this era in fact viewed adoption as "the
ideal,"69 but it was an ideal that could "very rarely [be] secured." 70
Except for children under the age of three, adoptive homes7" were
simply too difficult to find. Agencies thus used children's institutions
and foster placement to provide care for those children who could
not be placed in adoptive homes.72
Until the 1950's, the demand for adoptive infants continued to be
smaller than the supply,73 precluding any large-scale effort to move
childen out of foster care into adoptive placements. The selection of
children for foster care or for adoption was largely influenced by
market forces. Healthy white foundlings were slated for adoption be-
cause they were most in demand; older, nonwhite, and chronically ill
children were slated for foster care-even if their natural parents
were willing to relinquish them permanently-largely because they
were not in demand.74
recognize adoption. See Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient andModern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743,
745-49 (1956); Presser, supra note 66, at 443.
Twenty-four states enacted adoption statutes in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. See id. at 474 n. 136. The passage of the statutes coincided with the peak of the foundling
societies' child-placing activities and most probably resulted from their lobbying efforts. See
id. at 453, 474; see also Zainaldin, The Emergence ofa Modern American Family Law." Child Custod,
Adoption, and the Courts, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 1038, 1043-44 & n.13 (1979).
68. Legal adoption imposed upon the adoptive parent a duty to support the child. See
sources cited in note 67 supra.
69. Folks, Family Life for Dependent Children, in CARE OF DEPENDENT, NEGLECTED, AND
WAYWARD CHILDREN 75- 80 (C. Birtwell & A. Spencer eds. 1893), quoted in 2 CHILDREN AND
YOUTH, supra note 55, at 323.
70. Id. at 323.
71. Throughout the nineteenth century, and particularly during the first decades fol-
lowing the passage of the adoption acts, commentators failed to distinguish between legal
adoption and "placing out" a child in a free foster home. See, e.g., Theis, How Foster Children
Turn Out, PROC. NAT. SOC. WORK CONF. 121-24 (1924), quoted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH,
supra note 55, at 423; Letter from a correspondent in Battle Creek, Michigan, to the Chil-
dren's Aid Society (Dec. 5, 1859),quotedin Pressersupra note 66, at 486; see also A. KADUSHIN,
supra note 23, at 318 (describing placing out as "a kind of pseudo adoption .. . [whose]
intent was actually to prevent the return of the child to his own home"); Presser, supra note
66, at 486 ("there are many indications that the children [who had been placed out] .. were
thought of in the way we now think of adopted children").
72. See Folks, supra note 69, quoted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 325
(state paid foster care should be obtained "for those children who are not especially attrac-
tive, are too old for adoption and too young to be serviceable"); see also H. FOLKS, THE CARE
OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN 130 (1900); Letter from L. Alden
to American Social Science Association Meeting (Sept. 9, 1879), quoted in 2 CHILDREN AND
YOUTH, supra note 55, at 294.
73. See notes 94-99 infra and accompanying text.
74. As late as 1958, two noted child welfare experts considered as "readily adoptable
[only those] children who are under five years of age, white, average or above in intelligence,
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Long term placement in foster care has thus resulted both from
the child welfare system's traditional reluctance to return children to
the parents from whom they have been rescued, and from the sys-
tem's inability to find adoptive or other free homes for all of the chil-
dren who come into state care. In recent years, child welfare funding
and agency work allocation policies have reinforced these deeply in-
grained patterns. Agencies typically receive money to provide sup-
port services for children in foster care, but do not receive money to
provide such services for families of children who have been returned
home or for adoptive parents.7 5 In addition, agencies are usually
structured such that one group of workers handles adoptions and an-
other handles foster care with little or no coordination between the
two groups.7" Tradition, complemented by bureaucracy, has pro-
moted long term foster care.
3. Discouraging substitute attachments.
Throughout its history, the child welfare system has largely se-
lected placements for children on the basis of cost rather than quali-
ty.77 Indenture provided the employer with free labor until the child
reached maturity, but failed to provide the child with protection
from neglect or abuse.7 8 In the poorhouse and even in specialized
with no irremediable physical disabilities and no serious personality problems." H. MAAS &
R. ENGLER, supra note 5, at 383.
75. See J. KNITZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 26 (no funds for "restorative" services);
NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6 (federal financial aid pattern encourages
continuation of foster care); Wald, supra note 8, at 679 (agencies lose money when the child is
returned home even if he still receives services). See generaly English, The Foster Care System and
the Role ofLegal Services, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1234, 1244-1245 (1981).
76. S e J. KNIrrZER & M. ALLEN,supra note 1, at 91-92 (describing organizational struc-
ture of the California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey agencies).
77. Discussions of child care alternatives have perennially included cost comparisons. A
nineteenth century encomium on behalf of foster care is typical: "The cost, too, should [be]
. . . a powerful inducement. A child's expense in an Asylum, Poor House, or Reformatory
for a year, cannot be less than one hundred dollars, and may be much more; the placing out
costs but a small sum." Brace, What Is the Best Method/or the Care o/Poor and Vicious Children?, 2
J. Soc. Sci. 93 (1880), quoted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 292. For addi-
tional examples, see 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 275-76, 647-49 (advantage of
specialized institutions over poorhouse); 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 322-26,
370-72 (advantages of foster care over institutional care); see also Areen, supra note 52, at 896;
tenBroek, supra note 50, at 286.
78. An 1865 report on indentured children in Massachusetts stated that: "[O]f all the
children annually sent out . . . not more than ten per cent probably have their condition
made known to the officers who sent them." Sanborn, The Children Indentured at Monson, in
MASSACHUSETrs STATE BD. OF CHARITIES, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1865), quotedin 2 CHIL-
DREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 332; see also Folks, supra note 69, quoted in 2 CHILDREN
AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 323-24 ("the earlier forms of. . . indentures seem to have been
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children's institutions, children were required to work for their keep
in conditions that often resembled a reformatory more than a
home.79 Children who were neither indentured nor institutionalized
were placed in homes without careful consideration of the care they
would receive there.8" For example, between 1853 and 1880, the
New York Children's Aid Society, a leader in "child rescue" work,
sent thousands of children by train from New York City to the mid-
west, where they were handed over to any person who wanted a
child.8' Even when the state paid for the child's keep in a foster
home, it devoted little attention to careful selection or supervision of
the placement.82
Within such a system, multiple placements were common.83 In-
drawn with the sole idea of 'protecting' the foster parents against the loss of the child's serv-
ices and afforded little or no safeguard to the child against the possible cupidity or cruelty of
the master").
79. "The attitude of those responsible for the institution[s] was that the boys and girls
were unfortunate objects of charity, and therefore should be content with whatever was done
for them." H. THURSTON, THE DEPENDENT CHILD 70-71 (1930), quotedin 2 CHILDREN AND
YOUTH, supra note 55, at 285. For other contemporary descriptions of institutional life, see 2
CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 263-69, 285-91.
80. For discussion of a celebrated case that exemplifies careless nineteenth century child
placement practices, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1874, at 8, col. 2 and Apr. 11, at 2, col. 5, quoted
in, 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 185-87 (discusses the case of Mary Ellen
Wilson).
81. Compare E. WINES, THE STATE OF PRISONS AND OF CHILD-SAVING INSTITUTIONS
129 (1880 & photo. reprint 1968) (40 to 50 thousand placed) with H. FOLKS, supra note 72, at
45 (1000 placed per year between 1854 and 1875). For an eyewitness' description of the
placement process, see Hart, Placing Out Children in The West, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION 143-50 (1884), quoted in 2 CHILDREN
AND YOUTH, supra note 55, at 305-07.
82. See, e.g., Folks, State Superovision of Child-Caring Agencies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION (1895), quoted in 2 CHILDREN AND
YOUTH, supra note 55, at 339-40 ("It is unfortunately the case that in most systems of State
supervision and inspection, these children seem to be practically lost sight of, and to be re-
garded as no longer the wards of the state. The abuses. . . are. . . not limited to institutions
[but] extend. . . to the children who are in families.").
Problems of home selection and continued supervision after placement still exist today.
A 1973 Massachusetts survey found that the child welfare agency had not visited 25.9% of the
surveyed foster children within one year of placement; a California survey found that 20%
had not been evaluated within one year of placement. See S. VASALY, supra note 24, at 51; see
also note 35 supra.
83. Multiple foster care placements were apparently as common at the turn of the cen-
tury as they are now. For example, a 1915 Boston Children's Aid Society's self-evaluation
found that "129 children had been cared for in a total of 498 homes or families, this being an
average of almost four homes for each child. . . .For the 498 homes there were 528 place-
ments, which is an average of more than four placements for a child." Lawton & Murphy, A
Study of Resulis of a Child Placing Society, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
CHARITIES AND CORRECTION 164-74 (1915), quoted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note
55, at 421.
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stitutionalized children were indentured or placed in homes when
they became old enough to work; children who were placed were
returned if they did not work out in accordance with their foster par-
ents' needs.
Around the turn of the century, child labor gradually fell into
disrepute, necessarily curtailing the number of free homes available
for older children. 4 Concurrently, the idea of rehabilitating natural
parents so that children could be returned home after a short period
in state-financed placement gained currency. 5 This goal of family
reconstruction provided a new rationale for agencies to pay only cur-
sory attention to the number and quality of foster care placements.
The rehabilitative ideal also led agencies to discourage the develop-
ment of ties between foster parents and children. Foster parents were
now warned not to take too great an interest in their foster child, and
disobedience was sometimes met by abrupt removal of the child to
another home. 6
Of course, the rehabilitative ideal directly contravened the child
welfare system's long tradition of disdain for natural parents. The
resulting tension between tradition and the new goals produced the
foster care system as we know it. Acting pursuant to the new family
reconstruction ideal, agencies have discouraged the development of
stable substitute relationships for children in foster care. Acting on
the basis of tradition, the same agencies have invested little energy in
parental rehabilitation and have discouraged the maintenance of ties
between the child and his natural parents. Foster children have been
caught in the middle: As a result of the system's conficting aims, they
84. For descriptions of the movement against child labor, see 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH,
supra note 55, at 601-04; W. FRIEDLANDER, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL WELFARE 393-99 (3d
ed. 1968).
85. The rehabilitative ideal developed during the late nineteenth century in the context
of the correctional system. It produced innovations such as the indeterminate sentence, pro-
bation, and the juvenile court. The child rescue movement itself was partially motivated by
hopes of crime prevention; it originally sought to rehabilitate children by placing them in a
new environment. The notion of rehabilitating parents did not gain much currency, how-
ever, until after the turn of the century. For descriptions of the rehabilitative ideal as applied
to juvenile delinquency, see A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969); Fox, Juvenile tJaice Refonn:
An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970).
86. Placement agreements continue to provide explicitly that the child may be removed
at the discretion of the child care agency. For example, Connecticut's "Agreement for Board
and Care of Children Committed to the State Welfare Commissioner" provides that: "The
State Welfare Commissioner reserves the right to remove [the] child at any time from the
[foster] home and upon such removal this agreement is cancelled immediately." GFS I, supra
note 8, at 24 n.ll.
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have been left to drift in long term temporary placements with little
hope of any stable parental relationship.
II. THE PERMANENCY PROGRAM
A. Adoption: The Remedy of Choice
For many years, problems within the foster care system went
largely unnoticed. Concern over foster care drift did not surface un-
til the 1950's, when investigators suddenly "discovered" that many
children in foster care remained there for long periods of time." And
not until the early 1970's did reformers react to drift with a consoli-
dated permanency program. 8 By this time, the goal of family reha-
bilitation through social casework had itself come under attack.
State intervention into family life was now seen as potentially harm-
ful rather than merely beneficent, and the rehabilitative ideal of fos-
ter care deemed a failure.89
Because of this change in philosophy, the permanency program
has focused less effort on the admittedly difficult task of improving
foster care than on getting as many children as possible out of foster
care. Toward this latter end, the program has called for increased
efforts to keep children in their natural families,90 mandatory peri-
odic review of placements to ensure that children who can go home
87. The national 1959 survey of foster care conducted by Maas and Engler was the first
major study to note the problems of foster care drift. See H. MAAS & R. ENGLER, supra note 5.
88. For the first systematic permanency program proposals, see GFS I, supra note 8, at
97-101; Mnookin, supra note 8, at 628-35.
89. For a review of the literature on the impact of social casework, see 2 S. WHITE, M.
DAY, P. FREEMAN, S. HANTMAN & K. MESSENGER, FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR YOUNG CHIL-
DREN: REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 238-87 (1973); see also INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL
ADMIN., AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT 38-44 (Tent.
Draft 1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS I]; A. KADUSHIN, supra note 23, at 98-108;
Fischer, Is Case Work Effictive? A Review, 18 SOc. WORK 5 (1973).
Just as the rise of the rehabilitative model of child welfare tracked similar developments
in juvenile corrections, see note 85 supra, the decline of the rehabilitative ideal in child welfare
paralleled a growing skepticism over the possibility of rehabilitating juvenile delinquents and
criminals. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT
ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1969); J. MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISH-
MENT (1971); E. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION: RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY
PROBLEM (1973).
90. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS I, supra note 89, § 6.4(c) ("permit[ting] removal only
when the child cannot be protected from the specific danger justifying removal without
resorting to removal"); GFS I, supra note 8, at 100 (permitting removal from the child's
current home (including foster home) only when it can be established "that the child is un-
wanted and that the child's current placement is not the least detrimental available
alternative").
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do so, 9 t and most importantly, termination of parental rights to free
the child for adoption in those cases in which it appears that the
parents will not be able to resume custody in the near future.92
Adoption, a linchpin in this scheme, is generally preferred to all
other types of permanent care arrangements. 93
The program's reliance on adoption as a solution to foster care
drift has been made possible by changes in the "market" for adoptive
children. Although the supply of exceeded demand for adoptive
children throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
this is no longer the case. By the 1950's, the tide had turned, and
fewer adoptive children were available than couples who wanted
one.94 The result was a black market for babies.9 5 Although the gap
between supply and demand narrowed during the 1960's,96 by 1975
demand once again drastically exceeded supply.97 The greater avail-
ability of abortion and contraception, as well as a new willingness of
unwed mothers to keep their babies, all but dried up the supply of
traditionally adoptable children. 98 The dearth of these highly desira-
ble infants caused a reorientation by the child welfare system toward
the adoption of older foster children.99 While adoption of these "sec-
91. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS I, supra note 89, § 7.1, at 135-39 (requiring mandatory
court review of placement every six months); Wald, supra note 8, at 679-81, 703 (same).
92. See notes 116-22, 128-139 infra and accompanying texts.
93. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 8, at 699 (adoption is generally preferred over guardian-
ship or permanent placement, since it "provides the child with a stable family setting"); see
also note 132 infra.
94. In 1955, two commentators estimated that 900,000 childless families were seeking to
adopt 90,000 available children. Elson & Elson, Lawyers and Adoption: The Lawyer's Responsibil-
io in Perspective, 41 A.B.A. J. 1125, 1126 (1955). Nationwide, there was an 80% increase in
adoption petitions between 1944 and 1953. See Schapiro, A Study of Adoption Practice, in I
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA 16 (1956).
95. The problem became extensive enough that congressional hearings on black market
adoptions were held in 1953. See Senate Judiciay Comm., Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Dein-
quenc, Hearings July 15-16, 1953, 84 Cong., 1 Sess. (1955). The Senate passed several versions
of a bill outlawing black market adoptions, but none were acted upon by the House of Repre-
sentatives. See 3 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 55.
96. See Bodenheimer, Naew Trends and Requirementr in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legisla-
tive Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 10, 15 (1975); A. KADUSHIN, supra note 23, at 472.
97. See Bodenheimer, supra note 96, at 13 (reporting substantial decline in California
adoptions between 1968 and 1973 despite continuing unsatisfied demand for adoptive chil-
dren); A. KADUSHIN, supra note 23, at 469 (reporting decline in adoptions by nonrelatives in
twenty representative states from 48,744 in 1970 to 29,528 in 1975).
98. A. KADUSHIN, supra note 23, at 472. In 1975, adoption agencies throughout the
country stopped or slowed taking applications for white unhandicapped infants. Prospective
adoptive parents were explicitly told that there was likely to be a three to five year wait for
such a child. Id. at 470.
99. Id. at 547-48; see also Bodenheimer, supra note 96 at 13-14.
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ond rate" children would have been highly unlikely in earlier years,
by the mid-1970's it had become a realistic possibility.
Adoption is not, however, the only procedure by which foster
children could be assured stable placements.' ° A guardianship or-
der, for example, would enable the child to remain in a single foster
home where he may have developed ties, while permitting continued
visitation by the natural parents and other family members.10' A
long term foster care contract could accomplish a similar result; the
contract could prohibit the child welfare agency from removing the
child from the foster home and could clarify the rights of both foster
and natural parents.
In some American jurisdictions, both a guardianship order and a
long-term foster care contract would leave open the possibility of a
subsequent attempt by the natural parent to regain custody 10 2 or by
the foster parent to return the child to the child welfare agency. 10
3
But legislative amendment of foster care and guardianship statutes
could easily foreclose these obstacles to permanency. 10 4 Moreover,
100. For a detailed analysis of legal placement options other than adoption that are
now available for children in foster care, see M. HARDIN, Legal Placement Options to Achieve
Permanence for Children in Foster Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS (1983).
101. Typically, a probate court handles the appointment of a guardian. A guardian
generally has the exclusive right to custody, control, and discipline of the child, but frequently
has no duty of support. For example, the Uniform Probate Code provides that: "A guardian
of a minor has the powers and responsibilities of a parent who has not been deprived of
custody of his minor and unemancipated child, except that a guardian is not legally obligated
to provide from his own funds for the ward and is not liable to third persons by reason of the
parental relationship for the acts of the ward." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-209, 8 U.L.A. 518
(1975).
Where a stepparent, foster parent, or relative with whom a child has lived wishes to be
appointed guardian, some courts have denied objections by the noncustodial parent. See, e.g.,
In re Marino, 30 Cal. App. 3d 952, 106 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1973); In re Stuart, 280 N.Y.2d 245, 20
N.E.2d 741, 10 N.Y.S.2d (1939).
102. See, e.g., Forrester v. Livingston, 216 Ga. 798, 120 S.E.2d 174 (1961) (parent has
right to custody as against statutory guardian if fit); Melroy v. Keiser, 123 Kan. 513, 255 P.
978 (1927) (parent has right to custody if he has not legally surrendered it and has not been
adjudged unfit).
103. Even devoted foster parents sometimes return a child to care in eases of serious
illness, death, changed circumstances within the foster family, or when the child proves too
difficult. See B. TIZARD, ADOPTION: A SECOND CHANCE 235 (1978). To minimize this dan-
ger, the guardianship order or foster care contract should specify that it is not revocable
without court approval. Cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-210, 8 U.L.A. 520 (1975)
("[r]esiguation of a guardian does not terminate the guardianship until it has been approved
by the court"). Of course, as a practical matter, neither an adoption order nor a guardianship
order can prevent a child from being returned.
104. An English law reform commission recently suggested that guardianship should be
considered whenever a relative or foster parent applies to adopt a child. The commission
would require the court "first to consider whether guardianship would be more appropriate
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this type of legislative action would require a considerably less drastic
revision of current law than the revision required by the permanency
program. Nor are these alternatives without precedent. Some other
countries routinely utilize similar forms of "open" adoption.'0 5 And
many innovative American courts, acting on the basis of the child's
perceived needs but without the benefit of specific statutory authori-
zation, have in fact simultaneously granted permanent custody to a
nonparent and visitation rights to the natural parents 10 6 or to other
in all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the long term welfare of
the child." HOME OFFICE & SCOTrISH EDUC. DEP'T, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN, CMD. 38, No. 5107, §§ 115, 137 (1971-1972). Under this proposal,
the guardian has the obligation to support the child; the noncustodial parent ordinarily has
visiting rights and may be required to make a contribution to the child's maintenance. See id.
§§ 123, 130. Parliament adopted these recommendations in the Adoption Act, 1976, ch. 36,
§ 14, 14(3), at 668, but they have not yet gone into effect. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 13.34.231-.236 (Supp. 1983) (authorizing guardianship rather than termination of the par-
ent-child relationship when "in the best interests of the family.").
A prominent American commentator has also recommended routine use of "an interme-
diate alternative to adoption" in stepparent adoptions. Bodenheimer, supra note 96, at 44-47;
see also Derdyn, A Case for Permanent Foster Placement of Dependent, Neglected and Abused Children,
47 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 604, 612 (1977) (recommending permanent foster care place-
ment "[w]hen there are unbroken emotional or unbreakable legal ties to biological parents
and a child might thereby remain unavailable for adoption').
105. The term "open adoption" apparently was coined by Baran, Pannor, and Sorosky
in 1976. They defined an open adoption as one "in which the birth parent meets the adoptive
parents [and] relinquishes all legal, moral and nurturing rights to the child, but retains the
right to continuing contact and knowledge of the child's whereabouts and welfare." Baran,
Pannor and Sorosky, Open Adoption, 21 Soc. WORK 97 (1976). In open adoption, ties to the
former family are typically preserved, but the adopting parent assumes the primary obliga-
tion of support. Several European countries use this type of adoption proceeding. See 2.
CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] arts. 360-370 (76e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1976-1977) (France);
CODIGO CIVIL art. 180 (Edicion official 1975) (Spain); A. EHRENZWEIG & E. JAYME, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAw 232-33 (1973) (Italy). Germany has traditionally recognized only open
adoptions, but a bill pending in 1975 proposed to limit open adoption to those by stepparents.
See Bodenheimer, supra note 96, at 46 n.197.
106. See, e.g., In re Marino, 30 Cal. App. 952, 106 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1973) (awarding cus-
tody to aunt who had cared for child for six years with visitation to natural father); Ross v.
Hoffman, 33 Md. App. 333, 364 A.2d 596 (Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (awarding custody to "baby-
sitter" who had provided full-time care five days each week for eight years, with "liberal"
visitation to the natural mother), modified, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977); Bennett v.
Marrow, 59 A.D.2d 492, 399 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1977) (awarding custody to caretaker of eight
years, with visitation to natural mother); Reflow v. Reflow, 24 Or. App. 375, 545 P.2d 894
(1976) (awarding permanent custody to relatives who had provided care during most of five
year period, with visitation to natural parents). English courts have reached similar results.
See, e.g., In re S. [1975] 1 All E.R. 109 (C.A. 1974); In re J. [1973] 2 All E.R. 410 (Fam. 1973).
See general.y Derdeyn, Rogoff & Williams, Alternatives to Absolute Tennination of Parental Rights
After Long Term Foster Care, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1175-79, 1185-92 (1978) (detailed case
history of successful permanent placement with foster parents permitting visitation by natural
parents).
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family members.1"7
The critical difference between adoption and these alternative
means of securing stable placements is that adoption requires the sev-
erance of all ties with the natural family, while the other procedures
do not.10 8 The child welfare system's poor law heritage and its tradi-
tional disdain for natural parents undoubtedly fostered a bias among
reformers in favor of the adoption approach. But permanency pro-
gram advocates have supported their preference for adoption, and,
concomitantly, for easier termination of parental rights, on the basis
of psychoanalytic theory. This theory, they claim, establishes that
termination of parental rights followed by adoption is the best means
of satisfying foster children's psychological needs. To this theoretical
basis for the permanency program we now turn.
B. Goldstein, Freud & Solnit: The Program -s Theoretical Basis
The permanency program owes much of its design and its entire
theoretical basis to Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit.
In 1973, this distinguished interdisciplinary trio0 9 published Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child, 11O in which they presented proposals for
reforming the child welfare system that were supported by a concep-
tual framework drawn from psychoanalytic theory. 1 ' Every subse-
107. See, e.g., People ex. rel. Sibley v. Shepard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 445
N.Y.S.2d 420 (1981) (granting paternal grandparents' adoption petition but giving visitation
rights to maternal grandmother); In re Anthony S., 113 Misc. 2d 26, 448 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fam.
Ct. 1982) (granting adoption petition giving visitation rights to biological siblings); cf.
Schomer v. Scheidt, 89 Ill. App. 3d 92, 411 N.E.2d 554 (1980) (denying one set of grandpar-
ents' adoption petition in order to preserve the other grandparents' visitation rights).
108. An adoption decree generally "relieve[s] the natural parents of the adopted indi-
vidual of all parental rights and responsibilities, and . . . terminatefs] all legal relationships
between the adopted individual and his relatives, including his natural parents, so that the
adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for all purposes including
inheritance. .. ." REv. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 14(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 44 (1979).
109. Joseph Goldstein is the Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University Law School
and a professor at the Yale Child Studies Center; Anna Freud was the Director of the Hamp-
stead Child Therapy Clinic and the author of numerous books and articles on child develop-
ment and psychoanalysis; and Albert J. Solnit is the Sterling Professor of Pediatrics and
Psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine and the Director of the Yale University
Child Study Center.
110. GFS I, supra note 8.
111. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit indicate that they "used psychoanalytic theory to de-
velop generally applicable guidelines to child placement," id. at 5, but they seldom provide
support for or explanations of how psychoanalytic theory supports the standards they pro-
pose. For a discussion of evidence that undermines their theses, see notes 155-68 infra and
accompanying text.
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quent proposal to reform the child welfare system has drawn its
vocabulary and central ideas from this framework.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit base their reform program on two
fundamental beliefs. First, they claim "the law must make the child's
needs paramount";'" 2 thus, in their view, the needs of the developing
child restrict parental "rights." Second, they give permanency in re-
lationships a paramount position among these developmental
needs."1 3 Accordingly, under their proposed standards, the state
should not disrupt the relationship between a "wanted child" ' 4 and
a "psychological parent" except in the gravest circumstances.
A psychological parent may be anyone-a biological, adoptive,
or foster parent-who, "through interaction, companionship, inter-
play, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological . . . as well as
physical needs."'1 5 Thus, a foster parent who has established a rela-
tionship with a child takes precedence over a natural parent, even if
the natural parent has lost custody of the child through no fault of
his own. 1 6 In Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit grant such a foster parent a presumption in favor of con-
tinuing custody. 17 Under the scheme elaborated in their successor
volume, Before the Best Interests of the Child, 18 a foster parent of a child
placed before age five may obtain permanent custody by showing
that he has continuously cared for the child for two years; showing
one year of continuous care suffices if the child was placed before age
three. 1 9 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit give continuity of care such
112. GFS I, supra note 8, at 7.
113. "The child's developmental needs are best served by continuing, unconditional,
and permanent relationships." Id at 99.
114. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit define a "wanted child" as one "who receives affec-
tion and nourishment on a continuing basis from at least one adult and who feels that he or
she is and continues to be valued by those who take care of him or her." Id. at 98.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 99-100.
117. To alter a child's placement, the natural parent must establish "(i) that the child is
unwanted; and (ii) that the child's current placement is not the least detrimental available
alternative." Id. at 100. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit define the "least detrimental available
alternative" as that placement "which maximizes, in accordance with the child's sense of
time, the child's opportunity for being wanted and for maintaining on a continuous, uncondi-
tional and permanent basis a relationship with at least one adult who is or will become the
child's psychological parent." Id. at 99.
118. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD (1979) [hereinafter cited as GFS II].
119. Id. at 188, 194-95. If the child was over five years old at the time of placement,
had been in the continuous care of his parents for not less than the preceding three years, and
was not separated from his parents because of sexual or physical abuse, the natural parent
could request a hearing to contest termination. In order to succeed, the parent must show
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weight that, for them, not even the infliction of serious emotional
harm justifies removing a child from his current home.1 20
But Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's proposals do more than pro-
vide continuity; this could be ensured through a simple custody
transfer from the state to the foster parent, like that which can be
effected through guardianship or a foster care contract.1 2 1 Under
their scheme, a grant of custody to the foster parents, like an adop-
tion proceeding, serves to terminate all rights of the natural parents,
including the right to visitation or contact with the child.1 22 They
further propose that, when a court denies visitation rights to the nat-
ural parents, 123 it should not even consider the reasons the natural
parents cannot resume custody or the strength of the parent-child
relationship. 124 Termination automatically follows a transfer of cus-
tody to the foster parent.
According to Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, the custodial parent
should have total control over the child's contact with his noncus-
todial parent because the risks of conflicting parental loyalties out-
weigh the advantages of maintaining contact:
Children have difficulty in relating positively to, profiting from,
and maintaining contact with two psychological parents who are
not in positive contact with each other. Loyalty conflicts are com-
mon and normal under such conditions and may have devastating
consequences by destroying the child's positive relationships to
both parents. A "visiting" or "visited" parent has little chance to
serve as a true object for love, trust, and identification, since this
role is based on his being available on an uninterrupted day-to-day
basis. 12
5
For Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, permanence requires not just con-
tinuity of care but also the exercise of absolute authority and receipt
that he is still the child's psychological parent and that the child's return to him would pro-
vide the least detrimental alternative. Id. at 195.
120. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's position that "emotional neglect" does not justify
removal derives, at least in part, from the difficulty of defining the term precisely enough to
avoid unwarranted state intrusion. See id at 75-90; see also GFS I, supra note 8, at 99 (state
policy should "minimize disruptions of continuing relationships between a psychological par-
ent . . . and the child").
121. See notes 100-07 supra and accompanying text.
122. All placements are to be "unconditional and final, that is, the court shall not retain
continuing jurisdiction over a parent-child relationship or establish or enforce such conditions
as rights of visitation." GFS I, supra note 8, at 101; see also id at 116-21.
123. The rationale by which Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit justify the custodial parent's
denial of visits by the natural parents-a fear that visitation will undermine the custodial
parent's authority-applies to visits by any other family members as well.
124. See GFS II, supra note 118, at 75-90.
125. GFS I, supra note 8, at 39.
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of unquestioned loyalty by the custodial parent. They deem one
unambiguously authoritative parental relationship to be so funda-
mentally important in child development that they are willing to sac-
rifice the child's relationship with some psychological parents to
achieve it.
C. Reception of the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit Proposals
Although Beyond the Best Interests of the Child has provoked some
controversy t1 6 in the ten years since its publication, its central con-
clusions about the needs of children in long term foster care have
gained remarkably widespread acceptance. 127 Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit's premises have strongly influenced recent state foster care leg-
islation 28 and several model acts dealing with termination of paren-
126. For selected reviews of this book, through 1978, see Crouch, An Essay on the Critical
andJudiczal Reception ofBeyond the Best Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L.Q. 49 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Crouch, An Essay]. Although some reviews were critical, Crouch indicates that
the book quickly "became what any author could most fervently desire his or her book to
become; that which everyone must mention or risk being deemed as an ignorant provincial."
Id. at 50.
The critical response to Before the Best Interests ofthe Child has also been mixed. Compare
Besharov, Book Review, 34 VAND. L. REV. 481, 483 (1981) ("occasional overbreadth of their
definitions coupled with inflexibility of their decision making rules would often cause unwar-
ranted and overly harsh intervention by the state") and Wald, Book Review, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 645, 648 (1980) (grounds for intervention are "too narrow"; "basic premises supporting
nonintervention are often unpersuasive") with Crouch, Book Review, 14 FAM. L.Q. 121, 140
(1980) ("deserves some of the accolades so freely bestowed on [Beyond the Best Interests ofthe
Child]') and Frelich, Book Review, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1343, 1359 (1980) ("succeeds in putting
family privacy into the right place'). The primary criticism of the book has been aimed at
the authors' very restrictive standards for state intervention into the family, rather than at
their standards for termination of parental rights for children in foster care. Wald, for exam-
ple, dealing with termination in a footnote, "agree[s] with [the authors'] general position [on
termination, but] . . . find[s] many problems with the specifics." Wald, supra, at 651 n.21.
127. Many commentators and reports have based their proposals on these central con-
clusions. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 ("uniform national
review guidelines should be established requiring that parental rights will be evaluated
with[in] a fixed period of time, and upon termination of these rights, a plan should be devel-
oped for moving a child into adoption'); V. PIKE, S. DOWNS, A. EMLEN, G. DOWNS, & D.
CASE, PERMANENT PLANNING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A HANDBOOK FOR SOCIAL
WORKERS, 14 (1977) ("one should not consider returning a child [to his parents] when the
parents will not be able to make a home for them [sic] soon (within a year, or perhaps longer),
or when he has become. . . so deeply attached to his foster parents that he feels his future is
inextricably bound with theirs"); Wald, supra note 8, at 691 ("parental rights [should] be
terminated, in most cases, after the child has been in placement for a specified period of
time"); see also notes 128-39 ifra (describing recent model legislation).
128. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West 1982) (permitting termination when
the child "has been cared for in one or more foster homes for two or more consecutive years,
providing that the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the return of the child to
his . . . parents would be detrimental to the child and that the . . . parents have failed
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tal rights for children in long term foster care. 129 For example, the
influential StandardsforJuvenile Justice, drafted under the auspices of
the American Bar Association, 30 endorse "[p]rotection of the child's
interest [as] paramount,"'' 31 the concept of psychological parent-
during that period and are likely to fail in the future, to (i) provide a home for the child; (ii)
provide care and control for the child; (iii) maintain an adequate parental relationship with
the child; and (iv) maintain continuous contact with the child, unless unable to do so."); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 384-b(4)(d), 384-b(7) (McKinney Supp. 1982) (permitting termination
when parent "has failed for a period of more than one year following the date such child
came into . . . care. . substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact
with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and financially able to do so,
notwithstanding the agency's diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental rela-
tionship when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best interests of the child"); VA.
CODE § 16.1-283(C) (1978 & Supp. 1982) (permitting termination one year after placement
when parent has failed to maintain contact with child or to remedy conditions that led to
placement).
The judicial response has been somewhat less enthusiastic. For a summary of the cases,
see Crouch An Essay, supra note 126, at 102.
129. Nine model acts addressing termination of parental rights have appeared since the
publication of BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD:
1) ABA STANDARDS I, supra note 89;
2) INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN., AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE
AND NEGLECT (final ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS II].
3) MODEL ACT TO FREE CHILDREN FOR PERMANENT PLACEMENT (1978), reprinted in
Katz, Freeing Children for Permanent Placement through a Model Act, 12 FAM. L.Q. 204 (1978);
4) MODEL CHILD PLACEMENT CODE. See Wald, supra note 8, at 700-06.
5) REGIONAL RESEARCH INST. FOR HUMAN SERV., MODEL DISSOLUTION OF PARENT-
CHILD RELATIONSHIP ACT (1976) [hereinafter cited as MDR ACT].
6) NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVEN-
TION, STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1980) [hereinafter cited
as NAC STANDARDS];
7) NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, TERMINATION OF PA-
RENTAL RIGHTS STATUTE (1976), reprinted in [Reference File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 201:0069
(1977), and in NATIONAL BENCH BOOK FOR JUVENILE COURTS 119-23 (L.G. Arthur ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as JUDGES' ACT];
8) REGIONAL RESEARCH INST. FOR HUMAN SERV., RRI GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUN-
TARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS (1980) [hereinafter cited as RRI GUIDELINES];
and
9) U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, MODEL STATE ADOPTION ACT, 45
Fed. Reg. 10,622 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HHS MODEL ACT].
All of the model legislation except Wald's is summarized and compared in Hardin &
Tazzara, A Comparison ofModel Acts on Parental Rights Termination, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4025
(July 14, 1981).
130. There are two different sets of ABA standards. The first, ABA STANDARDS I,supra
note 89, published in 1977, provoked extensive debate and thus were not presented to the
ABA House of Delegates for approval in 1979, as originally planned. Instead, the standards
were redrafted and re-released in revised form as ABA STANDARDS II, supra note 129, in 1981.
ABA STANDARDS II reflect Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's influence less than ABA STAN-
DARDS I. In particular, the revised standards make termination more difficult to obtain. For
a comparison of the two sets of ABA standards, see notes 132-139 infra.
131. INSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN., AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE
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age, 32 adoption as the preferred disposition for foster children,'33
and a presumption favoring termination of parental rights once a
child has been in placement for three years if the natural parent ap-
pears unable to resume custody in the forseeable future.' 34 These
standards do not require the state to show that termination is neces-
sary to protect the child from harm or even that termination will
benefit him. Instead, they place the burden of proof on the natural
parent, who must show by clear and convincing evidence that termi-
nation would "be detrimental to the child" in order to retain visita-
tion privileges. 13
5
JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 106 (1977); see also ABA STANDARDS II, supra note 129,
Standard 1.5, at 56; cf. HHS MODEL ACT, .iipra note 129, § 101, at 10,650 ("when conflicts
arise between the rights of the adoptee and of others, the rights of the adoptee should
prevail.").
132. Standard 1.6 provides that "[T]he entire system of intervention should be designed
to promote a child's need for a continuous, stable living environment." ABA STANDARDS II,
supra note 129, at 57. This goal of continuity, and the time limits established for foster care
are based on the presumption that, after many years in the same foster home, children "will
probably view the foster parents as their 'psychological' parents." Id. § 7.5 commentary at
145; see also id. § 8.3 commentary at 156 ("judges. . . [correctly] recognize that in most situa-
tions the foster parents are the child's 'psychological parents' "); cf. HHS MODEL AcT, supra
note 128, § 102(a)(13), at 10,651 (foster parents who have cared for the child one year ac-
corded legal standing as "de facto parents').
133. ABA STANDARDS II, supra note 129, § 8.5, at 161 ("Where possible, adoption is
preferable'); cf NAC STANDARDS, supra note 129, 1 3,183 commentary (adoption preferred
disposition).
134. ABA STANDARDS II, supra note 129, § 8.3(c), at 163. If the child has been placed
by court order, these standards also require that the agency have fulfilled its obligations to the
parent as a precondition to termination. Id. If the child has been voluntarily placed, the
state must show that "the parents do not want or are unable to accept custody at the present
time; return of the child to the parent will cause the child to suffer serious and sustained
emotional harm; or the child is twelve years old and wants to be adopted." Id. § 8.3 commen-
tary at 162-63. These standards also permit termination on other grounds after a shorter
period in placement. Id. ABA STANDARDS I permit termination of parental rights to a child
under three after six months in placement. ABA STANDARDS I, supra note 89, §§ 8.3-8.4
commentary at 154-60. For a child over three, these standards also permit termination of
parental rights after a 6-month review hearing if the court finds that the parents have failed
to maintain contact with the child during the previous six months and to reasonably plan for
resumption of care. Id. § 8.3(b), at 154. Both ABA STANDARDS I and II allow only five
defenses to termination. For a description of these defenses, see note 135 infra.
The other recent model legislation generally follows this pattern of permitting termina-
tion upon a showing that the child has been in care for some time and that his parent will not
be able to regain custody in the foreseeable future. See, e.g., NAC STANDARDS, supra note 129,
§ 3.185(c), at 346; JuDGEs' AT, supra note 128, § 12(1); HHS MODEL ACT, supra note 129,
§ 313(d)(5), at 10,676.
135. ABA Standards II, supra note 129, § 8.4 commentary, at 74.
The standards actually include five exceptions to the rule requiring termination, and
only the first exception requires a showing of detriment to the child. ABA STANDARDS I,
supra note 129, § 8(4), at XXX. The other exceptions involve: (i) a child placed with a
relative; (ii) a child with special problems; (iii) a child for whom permanent family placement
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The ABA and other model standards typically deviate from
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's proposals, however, in two respects.
First, the standards establish only a presumption in favor of termina-
tion after the child has been in foster care for a set period of time,
which may be rebutted in a variety of situations.1 36 In this respect,
the model standards are more cautious than Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit's proposals, which urge automatic termination upon the request
of a foster parent who has continuously cared for a young child for
two years. 131 In another respect, however, the model standards are
much less cautious than Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's proposals:
Typically, they permit termination after the child has been in foster
care for a set period of time, whether or not he has been continuously
cared for by a foster parent who wishes to keep him permanently.
Children's ties to their natural parents are thus cut off in order to free
them for adoption by strangers as well as by persons who have be-
come psychological parents. 138 Indeed, the model standards do not
is unavailable; and (iv) a child over ten who objects to termination. Id. § 8(4), at XXX.
Exceptions (i), (ii), and (iv) by their terms apply only in limited circumstances, and exception
(iii) "must be applied very cautiously." ABA STANDARDS I, supra note 89, § 8(4) commentary
at 160. Furthermore, for all exceptions, a parent must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the exception is applicable. ABA STANDARDS II, supra note 129, § 8(4), at 173.
136. Under the NAC STANDARDS, for example, the court is not to terminate if it finds
that:
termination would be detrimental to the juvenile because of the closeness of the
parent-child relationship; the juvenile has been placed in a residential facility be-
cause of his/her physical or mental health problems and termination is not neces-
sary to provide a permanent family home; the juvenile has been placed with a
relative who does not wish to adopt him/her; the juvenile cannot be placed in a
family environment; or the juvenile objects.
NAC STANDARDS, supra note 129, § 3.185(c), at 346.
ABA STANDARDS I and II include five very similar exceptions to the rule that the court
should order termination. See ABA STANDARDS II, supra note 129, § 8.4, at 173; note 135
supra.
137. Termination upon request is available only for children placed under the age of
five. Parents of children placed over age five may request a hearing to contest termination.
See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
138. None of the standards limit termination only to those instances in which the foster
parent wishes to keep the child permanently. But cf. ABA STANDARDS II, supra note 129, at
163 (limiting termination/or children in private pacement to cases in which caretaker wishes to
adopt the child). In part, this difference may reflect a practical difficulty with Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit's scheme: Under their standards, a child could remain in foster care indefi-
nitely if no foster parent wanted to keep him permanently or if he moved so frequently that
the time necessary for a foster parent to obtain permanent custody never accumulated. But
the solution the model standards have generally adopted--substituting mere passage of time
for passage of time with a particular caretaker-creates new problems: It gives no guarantee
that the state will try to find the child a permanent home after termination.
There is evidence that an appreciable proportion of children freed for adoption will be
adopted by strangers rather than their foster parents. For example, one recent demonstration
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guarantee that anyone will ever adopt these children.'39 These stan-
dards therefore attribute even greater weight to the hypothesized
need for an unconditional, permanent relationship than do Gold-
stein, Freud, and Solnit; they implicitly deem that the mere possibil-
.ity of such a relationship outweighs the certain loss of the child's
natural parent and the possible loss of a current foster parent.
The widespread acceptance of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's the-
ories with respect to foster care sharply contrasts with the reaction to
their parallel conclusions about divorce. Since divorce and separa-
tion, like foster care, create the possibility of conflicting parental loy-
alties, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit would apply the same visitation
rules in those situations as they do in the foster care context: Once
one parent is awarded custody, they would give him total control
over the child's contact with the noncustodial parent."4 Unlike its
foster care equivalent, this proposal has met with an extremely nega-
tive response, 4' and there has been no movement towards its adop-
tion. Out of "concern for maintaining family relationships that can
provide emotional security for the children of divorcing parents,"' 42
most states have in fact gone in the opposite direction over the past
decade and expanded postdivorce visitation rights to include at least
project which sought to achieve permanency for children in foster family care returned 27%
of the project's children home and freed 52% for adoption; 31% were adopted by their foster
parents and 21% by parents unknown to them. See A. EMLEN, supra note 5, at 4-5.
139. Typically, termination does not require the current availability of an adoptive
home. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS I, supra note 89, § 8.5 commentary at 162; NAC STAN-
DARDS, supra note 129, § 3,183. But see MDR AcT, supra note 129, § XXI(B)(3) (court shall
order conditional decree of termination where it cannot determine whether an adoptive
placement is available).
140. See GFS I, supra note 8, at 62 (proposing a least detrimental alternatives standard,
"[w]hether the problem arises in separation, divorce, adoption, neglecting parent, foster care,
or even juvenile delinquency proceedings"). Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit are, however, will-
ing to abide by parental custody agreements following divorce or separation. Id. at 38. If the
parents cannot agree and both are "equally suitable in terms of the child's most immediate
predictable developmental needs," id. at 63, a "judicially supervised drawing of lots [is
deemed]. . . the most rational and least offensive process" of resolving who will gain custody,
id. at 153 n.12. Other things being equal, they would also permit the court to award custody
to the parent most willing to permit visitation. Id. at 118.
141. See, e.g., Benedek & Benedek, Post Divorce Visitation: A Child's Right, 16 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD PSYCHIATRY 256, 270 (1977) (their scheme "would provide no insurance that further
conflict would not ensue" and is a "simplistic formula"); Dembitz, ByondAny Dircipline's Com-
petence, 83 YALE L.J. 1304, 1310 (1974) ("The proposal is blind and untenablb.'); Foster,
Book Review, 12 WILLAMETrE LJ. 545, 550-51 (1976) (the no visitation rule is the "most
objectionable statement" in the book); Strauss & Strauss, Book Review, 74 COLuM. L. REV.
998, 1002 (1974) ("we are entirely unpersuaded. . . that the law must turn its face from one
of the divorcing parents').
142. Trends in Grandparent Third-Parpy Visitation Rights Legislation, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2587 (1981).
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the child's grandparents 43 and sometimes even his stepparents.' 44
Similar concerns have led a growing number of states to author-
ize, even to encourage, joint custody arrangements.141 In California,
for example, a court now must presume that joint custody is in the
best interests of the child if both parents agree to a joint custody
award.1 46 When a court denies one parent's petition for joint cus-
tody, it must "state . . .the reasons for . . . denial," and in choosing
the sole custodian, it must "consider . . .which parent is more likely
to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncus-
todial parent."'
' 47
To date, there has been little attempt by either legal commenta-
tors or child care experts to explain why divorce law reform has fo-
cused on maintaining family relationships while foster care reform
has focused on providing one unconditional relationship. A histori-
cal explanation lies in the traditional contrast between private family
law, which has consistently recognized parental rights, and the fam-
ily law of the poor, which generally has not. But if Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit are correct, there is no good reason to treat divorce and
foster care cases differently; the noncustodial parent's right to main-
tain a relationship with the child should be severed in either case.
143. By 1982, 40 states had statutes providing for grandparents' visitation rights after
divorce. See [Reference File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 400: iv-v (1982). In other states, courts
have recognized grandparents' visitation rights through judicial decision. See, e.g., Hawkins v.
Hawkins, 102 IIl. App. 3d 1037, 430 N.E.2d 652 (1981).
This trend has also produced some movement to provide visitation rights to grandpar-
ents of adopted children. So far, however, grandparent visitation rights have been accepted
primarily in the context of stepparent adoptions-adoptions likely to have resulted from a
divorce. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-9-2, 40-9-4
(1978 & Supp. 1982) (specifically denying rights to grandparents after adoption unless the adop-
tive parent is a stepparent or another grandparent); see also Bodenheimer, supra note 96, at 44-51
(supporting grandparent visitation rights in stepparent adoptions).
144. See, e.g., Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982) (child's best interests dic-
tate post-divorce visitation rights to stepfather); Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (awarding visitation rights to stepmother); Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33,
35-36 (Ky. 1979) (stating that court should award visitation rights to stepmother if it is in
child's best interest to do so).
145. Approximately 27 states now have legislation authorizing joint custody. See [Ref-
erence File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 400: iii-v (1982). In other states, courts have upheld joint
custody awards without specific statutory authorization. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480,
432 A.2d 63 (198 1); see also 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2506 (1982) ("U]oint custody legislation has
been taking the country by a storm; more recent joint custody enactments have evidenced a
trend toward elevating joint custody arrangements to a 'preferred' status").
146. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1982).
147. Id. § 4600.5(b)(1); see also ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-332(6) (West 1976 & Supp.
1981-1982) (provision similar to California's).
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There is much evidence, however, to suggest that Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit are wrong.
III. EVALUATING THE PERMANENCY PROGRAM
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit maintain that children require both
continuity of care and a parental relationship unmarred by loyalty
conflicts. The continuity principle mandates the transfer of legal cus-
tody to a foster parent if he has continuously cared for the child for a
lengthy period of time. This principle alone, however, does not jus-
tify termination of parental rights: Arrangements like permanent
guardianships or long term foster care contracts can ensure con-
tinuity while still permitting the natural parent to retain visitation
rights. 48 Only the child's alleged need for an unconditional relation-
ship with a parental figure provides support for termination. Despite
hot dispute over the wisdom of cutting off a child's contacts with his
noncustodial parent in the divorce and separation contexts, the new
permanency program standards accept without question the "uncon-
ditional relationship" justification for terminating parental rights in
the long term foster care situation.1 49 Unless Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit are wrong to equate the needs of children following divorce
and their needs following a transfer of custody to a foster parent, one
of these reform movements is on the wrong track. But even if Gold-
stein, Freud, and Solnit are correct in treating divorce and foster care
cases alike, the question remains whether the developing child is bet-
ter off facing the "difficulty [ofl relating positively to . . . two psy-
chological parents who are not in positive contact with each other '"'5
or facing the total loss of a noncustodial parent.
A. The Needs of Children Post-Divorce and Post-Foster Care.- Are They
Comparable?
Following divorce and following long term foster care, decisions
regarding parental rights must respond to the same dilemma: The
child has two (sets of) parents, and has probably had some kind of
148. See notes 100-07 supra and accompanying text.
149. At least some portions of the psychiatric community have also taken this dichoto-
mized stance toward the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit proposals. See COMMITTEE ON THE
FAMILY OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, NEW TRENDS IN CHILD
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 79 (1980) (concluding that the Goldstein, Fi-eud, and Solnit pro-
posals "appear valid as they apply to adoption and foster care" while contesting their applica-
bility to custody disputes in divorce; the authors report recent research on divorce but no
research on foster care or adoption in reaching these conclusions).
150. GFS I, supra note 8, at 38.
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relationship with both in the past, but he will be able to live with
only one of them in the future. 5' He will be able to maintain a rela-
tionship with the noncustodial parent only through visitation. More-
over, in both cases courts generally will award custody to the parent
who has played a more important role in the child's day-to-day life
and can more adequately provide for his day-to-day needs. Thus,
from the child's perspective the divorce and long term foster care
situations pose similar issues.
Of course, these two situations present differences as well. First,
in most divorce cases children will have lived with both parents until
shortly before the divorce, whereas a child in long term foster care
will have known his natural parent only as a visitor for some time.
Second, there is almost certainly a larger percentage of inadequate
parents among parents of children in foster care than among divorc-
ing parents.1 2 Neither of these factors, however, is likely to have any
appreciable impact on the key variable in the Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit analysis: the risk of loyalty conflicts.153 Indeed, if any differ-
ence at all exists as to this variable, one would expect the risks of
conflict to be lower for foster children than for children of divorce
because natural and foster parents are less likely to have a history of
personal antagonism than divorcing parents. 54
Conclusions in this area are necessarily impressionistic, since re-
searchers have never directly compared children whose parents have
divorced with children who have been in long term foster care. But
at present, there is nothing to suggest that if children do derive bene-
151. Increasing use of joint custody arrangements may change this pattern in divorce
cases. See notes 145-47 supra and accompanying text.
152. This follows from the observation that children often enter foster care because of
inadequate parenting. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted, how-
ever, that inadequate parenting is far from uncommon among children of divorced parents.
A recent study of divorce and its impact on children found that 15% of fathers suffered severe
psychiatric illness, 40% of father-child relationships were "profoundly troubled," and 20% of
the children moderately or intensely feared their fathers. J. WALLERSTEIN &J. KELLY, SUR-
VIVING THE BREAKUP: CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 253 (1980).
153. In some cases, a long separation from the noncustodial parent together with infre-
quent visits may reduce loyalty conflicts by nearly obliterating the child's tie to this parent.
For most children beyond infancy, however, mere day-to-day physical separation from a par-
ent destroys neither the parent's influence nor his importance to the child. See notes 207-09
infra and accompanying text. Researchers have reported children who retained a very strong
attachment to a parent even though separated from the parent before they were three and
visited by the parent very infrequently. See, e.g., A. EMLEN, supra note 5, at 13 (despite living
for seven years with the same devoted foster parents, a boy placed at age two retained pri-
mary attachment to his mother who visited only three times a year).
154. Of course, the natural and foster parents also have no history of mutual concern
and cooperation. Possibly, these factors offset each other.
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fits from the maintenance of family and parental ties-the view that
has strongly influenced recent divorce reform-loyalty conflicts are
more likely to reduce these benefits for children in long term foster
care than for children of divorce.
Arguably, of course, foster children derive fewer benefits from
maintaining parental ties than do children whose parents are di-
vorced. The benefits of visitation for a foster child, whose parent is
more likely than a divorced parent to be either inadequate or a rela-
tive stranger to the child, might be rather sparse. Because of this pos-
sibility, in evaluating the validity of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's
hypothesis with regard to foster children we must rely primarily on
evidence regarding these children rather than children of divorce.
Before looking at this evidence, however, a word is in order about
the research now available relating to Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's
proposal and the proposal's deficiencies.
B. Background: The Evidence Available
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit themselves do not burden the reader
with any discussion of the studies, theoretical work, or other evidence
supporting their proposals.'55 In fact, the evidence is sketchy and
often addresses the issues they raise only indirectly. And much of the
scant evidence that does exist contradicts their assertions.
On the continuity principle that they postulate, there is a cohe-
sive body of research that over many years and within a consistent
conceptual framework has directly addressed the relevant issues.
This research describes the effects of "maternal deprivation."' 5 6
Such deprivation, as described in John Bowlby's classic summation
of the early research, encompasses any situation where "the infant
and young child. . . [fails to] experience a warm, intimate, and con-
tinuous relationship with his mother (or mother-substitute), in which
both find satisfaction and enjoyment."' 57 The concept was devel-
155. Several commentators have noted Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's failure to provide
evidentiary support for their conclusions. See, e.g., Katkin, Bullington & Levine, Above and
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child- An Inquiy into the Relationship Between Social Science and Social
Action, 8 LAw & Soc. REv. 669, 672-76 (1974); Miller, Book Review, 23 DE PAUL L. REv.
1093, 1096 (1974); Wald, supra note 125, at 669 n.56.
156. For a list of the literature on which Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit rely, see GFS I,
supra note 8, at 127 n.3; GFS II, supra note 118, at 198-202 nn.8-10. In their second book,
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit attempted to distinguish the work of some maternal deprivation
theorists that contradicts their claims. Professor Michael Wald has identified and discussed
flaws in their argument. See, Wald, supra note 126, at 669 n.56.
157. J. BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH 67 (1951).
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oped from studies of institutionalized children conducted during the
1940's in which Bowlby and other researchers' 58 discovered that chil-
dren reared without a permanent parental relationship showed a
high level of language retardation and mental subnormality and that
both delinquency and serious personality disorders strongly corre-
lated with multiple separations of a child from his parental figure.
Based on this data, they postulated that a child's early experiences
with his caretakers may have serious and lasting effects on his
development.1
5 9
This general thesis is now widely accepted,16° and it supports
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's claim that continuity is important.
But the results of recent research suggest that discontinuity as a cause
of longrange 1 psychological problems1 62 is, on balance, outweighed
158. Frequently cited studies from this period include J. BOWLBY, FORTY-FOUR JUVE-
NILE THIEVES: THEIR CHARACTER AND HOMELIFE (1946); Bender & Yarnell, An Observation
ANursery, 97 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1158 (1941); Goldfarb, Infant Rearing and Problem Behavior, 13
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 249 (1943); Levy, Primar Afect Hunger, 94 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
643 (1937); Spitz, Hospitalism, 1 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY CHILD 53 (1945); Spitz & Wolf,
Anadlitic Depression, 2 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY CHILD 313 (1946).
159. See, e.g., J. BOWLBY, supra note 157, at 158 ("mother-love in infancy and childhood
is as important for mental health as are vitamins and proteins for physical health").
160. See, e.g., M. RUTTER, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION REASSESSED 123 (2d ed. 1981)
("Bowlby's [conclusion] which was regarded as very controversial twenty years ago is now
generally accepted as true"). For reviews of the maternal deprivation research since the
1940's, see id. at 131-218; J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS III: LoSS 443-62 (1980).
161. Separation from a parent undeniably produces short tenn distress and anxiety.
Most children react to separation with acute distress and crying, followed by misery and
apathy. Finally, the child may become detached and seem to lose interest in his parents. See
J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss: SEPARATION 8-11, 34-56 (1977); J. DUNN, DISTRESS
AND COMFORT 73-74 (1977). Pre and postseparation experience affects short term separation
reactions, just as they do long term ones. See. J. BOwLBY, supra, at 3-24, 33-56; J. DUNN,
supra, at 74-77; M. RUTTER, supra note 160, at 32-42.
162. Researchers have reported less deviant behavior in children of divorce or separa-
tion than in those living in intact homes where there is chronic conflict. Moreover, several
recent population epidemiological studies have shown strong links between marital discord
and conduct disorders in children in the absence of any separation experience. Also, for chil-
dren separated from parents in early childhood because of family discord or problems, re-
searchers have found fewer disorders among those who go to happy, harmonious homes than
among those who go to homes characterized by discord and disharmony. See, e.g., Rutter,
Parent-Child Separation:L Psychological Eects on the Children, 2 CHILD PSYCHOLOGY PSYCHIATRY
233 (1971). See generally M. RUTTER, supra note 160, at 109-13, 135-36 (summarizing recent
research differentiating effects of separation from effects of inadequate care). Rutter con-
cludes that "[a]ltogether the results strongly suggest that it is the quality of relationships
which matter rather than the [mere] presence or absence of separations," id. at 165, and that
"research has confirmed that, although an important stress, separation is not the crucial fac-
tor in most varieties of deprivation," id. at 217. This is apparently also the current view of
even John Bowlby, who has long been the leading proponent of the maternal deprivation
thesis. See J. BOWLBY, supra note 161, at 208-10 ("The main cause of such deviations (from
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by insufficient or inadequate care.'63 Moreover, researchers now
know that the impact of separation varies with the quality of the
parent-child interaction both before and after the separation 164 and
with the type of substitute care the child receives during the separa-
tion.' 65  This evidence suggests that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
probably overemphasize the importance of maintaining continuity of
care and avoiding separations of a child from his psychological par-
ent, while downplaying other factors such as the quality of care. 166
normality) is that during childhood, an individual's attachment behaviour was responded to
in an inadequate or inappropriate way. .. 2).
This is not to suggest that separation has a neutral impact on the child. Multiple separa-
tions, even without adverse home conditions, have been linked to an increased risk of later
psychiatric disturbance. See J. BOWLBY, supra note 161, at 410; M. RUTTER, supra note 160,
at 193; Douglas, Early Hospital Admissions and Later Disturbances of Behaviour and Learning, 7 DEV.
MED. CHILD NEUROLOGY 456, 460-63, 473-76 (1975). But see D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra
note 4, at 452 (multiple foster placements not associated with increased number of negative
behavioral symptoms).
163. See M. RUTrER, supra note 160, at 15-16; see also Ainsworth, The Eects ofMaternal
Deprivaton: A Review oFindings and Controvers in the Context a/Research Strateg, in DEPRIVATION
OF MATERNAL CARE: A REASSESSMENT OF ITS EFFECTS 97, 98-99 (World Health Organiza-
tion 1962) (urging that the term "depriving" be reserved for interactions of insufficient quan-
tity and that, for clarity, mother-child separation be excluded from the concept of maternal
deprivation altogether).
164. See, e.g., Moore, Stress in Normal Childhood, 22 HUM. REL. 235 (1969) (reporting a
correlation between the quality of a child's home life and psychological evaluation several
years later, among children who had experienced one or more stressful episodes-stays in a
residential nursery, hospital, or children's home, temporary absence of father, changes of
home, or birth of sibling); Wallerstein & Kelly, The Eects ofParental Divorce: Experiences ofthe
Preschool Child, 14 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 600 (1975) (strong correlation between
post-divorce changes in quality of mother-child relationship and child's psychological condi-
tion); see also J. BOWLBY, supra note 161, at 16-24, 222-23; J. DUNN, supra note 161, at 74-76;
M. RUTTER, supra note 160, at 34-42, 67-80, 135-36.
Studies of monkeys have also shown that pre- and postseparation experiences influence a
baby's reaction to separation itself. See Hinde & Davies, Removing Infant Rhesus/om Mother 13
Days Compared to Removing Mother/aom Infant, 13 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 227
(1972); Hinde & McGinnis, Some Factors Influencing the Eects of Temporaqy Mother-Infant Separa-
tion: Some Experiments with Rhesus Monkeys, 7 PSYCHOLOGICAL MED. 197 (1977); Hinde & Spen-
cer-Booth, Effects of Brief Separation faom Mother on Rhesus Monkeys, 173 SCIENCE 111 (1971);
Hinde & Spencer-Booth, Individual Diftrences in the Responses of aRhesusr Monkeys to a Period of
Separationaom Their Mothers, 11 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 159 (1970). For a
summary of the results of these experiments, see J. BOWLBY, supra note 161, at 71-74.
165. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at 364-65; C. HEINECKE & M. WEST-
HEIMER, BRIEF SEPARATIONS 314-15 (1966); Robertson & Robertson, Young Children in Brief
Separation: A Fresh Look, 26 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY CHILD 264 (1971). See generally CWLA
STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 26-27; D. KLINE & H. OVERSTREET, FOSTER CARE OF CHIL-
DREN: NURTURE AND TREATMENT 87-156 (1972).
166. Given this evidence, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's claim that a child should not be
removed even from a psychological parent who subjects him to serious emotional harm has
been justifiably criticized. See, e.g., Besharov, supra note 126, at 485-91; Wald, supra note 126,
at 663-93.
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The maternal deprivation literature has not, however, focused on
whether the harm caused by loyalty conflicts between parents out-
weighs the harm caused by losing a parent altogether. Nor has it
addressed the comparability of children's needs following divorce
and following long term foster care. The only available evidence on
these questions comes from research that varies remarkably as to
time, methodology, conceptual framework, and quality. The evi-
dence is also incomplete. For example, no one has directly compared
children who leave long term foster care through adoption, and are
thus precluded from visiting their natural parents, with children who
leave long term foster care through a permanent custody arrange-
ment, and are thus permitted to visit their natural parents.'67
Given these deficiencies in the evidence, the relative importance
of loyalty conflicts, relationships with noncustodial parents, and
other variables cannot be described with certainty. We must stand
prepared to revise our conclusions to conform to better data, should
it arrive. 1
68
C. Confict Between Natural Parent and Foster Parent
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit assert that termination of parental
rights is essential when a child's parents are not in positive contact
with each other. While they give no support for this proposition, it
does make intuitive sense that a child would experience more devel-
opmental problems in this situation than when the parents' relation-
ship is harmonious. But the key question, of course, is a different
one: Do the dangers of possible conflict between foster parent and
natural parent (or between divorcing parents) outweigh the potential
disadvantages of losing a parent altogether?
167. One study has compared five previously institutionalized children who were
adopted with seven who were restored to their natural parents after the age of four. Re-
searchers evaluated the children 42 years after their adoption or restoration. Both groups
manifested worse-than-average behavioral, learning, and concentration difficulties. The
adopted children, however, developed a stronger relationship with their new parents than did
the restored children with their natural parents. The researchers postulated that this differ-
ence was a result of the natural parents' ambivalence toward their children. See B. TIZARD,
supra note 103, at 151-79.
Another four children had remained in foster homes until evaluated 42 years later. Al-
though researchers made no direct comparisons of the children studied, they felt that these
foster homes were inferior to adoptive homes, at least in part because both the foster children
and parents apparently were anxious about the future stability of the placement. Id. at
198-211. Because the study involved only lemporaqy placement in foster homes, it does not
shed any light on the advantages of adoption vis-a-vis permanent custody with visitation.
168. For a useful list of child welfare research topics in need of data, see Wald, Legal
Policies Afrcting Children: A Lawyer's Requestfor Aid, 47 CHILD DEV. 1, 3-5 (1976).
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1. A visiting parent or no parent at all.
On this question, the available evidence suggests that, for most
children, the disadvantages of losing a parent are significant and
that, in comparison, the dangers of conflict are relatively slight. Evi-
dence from foster care research indicates that continued contact with
the natural parent generally promotes the child's sense of well-being
and emotional security. 169 The beneficial effect of maintaining these
ties is apparently felt even by children who were separated from their
parents at a very early age and whose subsequent contacts with their
parents are sporadic. Moreover, these benefits have been found
among randomly selected foster children, without excluding those
who have neglectful or inadequate parents.
One early study170 systematically analyzed the level of emotional
security17 1 displayed in the behavior of foster children. It found a
substantially higher degree of security among children who were per-
mitted some contacts with their previous homes (either their own or a
foster home) than among children who were not. 172 This finding is
especially striking since the child's contact with the previous home
was, in many cases, quite tenuous. A particularly interesting subsam-
ple of 30 children had experienced both types of change, one where
contact with the previous home had been maintained and another
where it had not. There again, contact with their previous homes
had a significant positive effect on the children's behavior. 173
Another early study of children in extended foster care 74 found
that children whose mothers wrote to them or sent them small gifts
169. It must be kept in mind that most studies have not measured the child's well-being
in any consistent manner, and one study measured it only by impressionistic evidence. See
VanderWaals, Former Foster Children Reflect on Their Childhood, 7 CHILDREN 29 (1960). Only
one study has determined well-being using a number of independent quantifiable measures.
See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, srupra note 4, at 486-88.
170. Cowen & Stout, A Comparative Study of the Adjustment Made by Foster Children After
Complete and Partial Breaks in Continuity of Home Environment, 9 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 330
(1939).
171. Cowen and Stout measured insecurity by looking at seven behavioral symptoms:
expressed loneliness for people or conditions from an earlier environment, enuresis, poor con-
tact with reality (day dreaming, lack of interest in the environment, and inadequate motiva-
tion), chronic fear, general sense of inadequacy, keen sense of inferior status, and persistent
disobedience. Id at 333.
172. Id at 337.
173. Id For a discussion of this study, see J. BowLBY, supra note 157, at 112-14.
174. VanderWaals, supra note 169 (followup study of 160 former foster children in Hol-
land reported benefits from parental contact, but apparently determined benefits solely on
impressionistic evidence).
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experienced greater feelings of self-confidence.17 Furthermore,
maintenance of these parental ties was not found to interfere with the
child's relationship to his foster parents. On the contrary, "[the] feel-
ing of being loved by their own mothers evidently helped in their
relationship with the foster parents, for these respondents also tended
to speak kindly of their foster parents." 176
More recent research has yielded similar conclusions. Wein-
stein, 177 for example, found that of 61 foster children age five or older
who had been in care for at least one year, the highest level of well-
being 178 occurred in those who identified 179 with their natural par-
ents and whose parents visited them; 8 ' the second highest level oc-
curred in children who identified with foster parents and whose
natural parents visited them; much lower levels of well-being oc-
curred in children who identified with foster parents and whose natu-
ral parents did not visit them. 8 ' Because half of the children in this
last category had spent most of their lives in their current foster
home, the study strongly supports the notion that permanent custody
arrangements that permit continued contact between the child and
his natural parent are preferable to absolute termination of parental
rights.'82
175. Id at 31.
176. Id.
177. E. WEINSTEIN, THE SELF IMAGE OF THE FOSTER CHILD (1960).
178. Weinstein measured "well-being" according "to what extent the child had devel-
oped the physical, intellectual, emotional, and social abilities and resources to weather his or
her life situation." Id at 65.
179. Weinstein determined "identification" by the child's responses to four questions:
"If you had some trouble or were worried, whom would you like to talk to about it? Whom
do you love most in all the world? Who loves you the most? If you could pick anyone in the
whole world to live with, whom would you pick?" Id. at 47. A child was considered to be
identified with his natural (or foster) parents only if he indicated his natural (or foster) par-
ents in response to all four questions. Otherwise, his identification was considered mixed. Id
180. Weinstein considered a child to be "visited" if his parent saw him more than twice
a year. Id. at 51, 54.
181. Id. at 68-70. Only one child was identified with a natural parent who did not visit.
His individual rating was lower than any group rating. Id. at 68.
182. A British researcher who attempted to replicate Weinstein's study has also reported
that her results support his findings. See Thorpe, The Experiences of Children and Parents Living
Apart, in NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION 90, 94 (J. Triseliotis ed.
1980). Thorpe measured the psychological adjustment of 21 children between the ages of 5
and 17 who had been in foster care for at least one year. She found that the degree of emo-
tional disturbance was significantly related to the child's age at placement and that children
who were in contact with their natural parents and/or siblings were better adjusted than
those who were not. (The latter finding was not statistically significant, however.) Thorpe
concluded that her "research supports. . . [the Weinstein] findings, and in addition it sug-
gests that lack of contact may lead to feelings of insecurity, confusion or anxiety about per-
sonal identity."
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A longitudinal study of children in long term foster care con-
ducted under the auspices of Columbia University-the most recent
and most thorough study to date-reported the same conclusions
about the value of parental visitation.1 83 In this study, researchers
found that frequent parental visitation correlated strongly with
higher ratings on a variety of scales designed to measure the child's
intellectual and emotional development."8 4 The researchers thus
urged that, "in the interests of the child's emotional well-being," pa-
rental visitation should be encouraged.1 85
What is impressive about the sum of this research is the uniform-
ity of its findings: Every study18 6 has reported that parental contact
had a positive influence on the children examined 87 Because child
183. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at 486-88.
184. Fanshel and Shinn compared frequently and infrequently visited children in foster
care at three points in time: Time 1-after being in foster care for at least 90 days; Time 2-
after about 21/2 years; and Time 3-after about five years. They found that frequently-visited
children showed significantly greater gains than the other children in nonverbal IQ scores
from Time I to Time 2; significantly greater gains in verbal IQscores over the full five years
of the study; more significant gains from Time 1 to Time 2 in emotional adjustment as mea-
sured by figure-drawing tests; significant improvement in Child Behavioral Characteristics
scores; and more positive assessments of the child by his classroom teacher. Id.
185. Id at 487. The researchers did not find, however, that parental visitation was an
"unalloyed blessing." After 21/2 years in placement, more frequently visited children showed
less capacity to cope with both separation and the foster care environment and a greater
propensity for identity conflicts than did less frequently visited children. After five years in
care, however, all of these differences had diminished. In fact, differences in the children's
ability to cope with the foster care environment were no longer statistically significant after
five years. Id. at 411.
Fanshel and Shinn cautioned that they "[did] not know whether it is harmful for a child
to openly struggle with the problem of conflicting loyalties to parents who visit." Id. at 412.
Yet, they concluded that, "[i]n the main, children are more able to accept additional con-
cerned and loving parental figures in their lives, with all the confusions inherent in such a
situation, than to accept the loss of meaningful figures.." Id. at 488. The authors thus
"strongly support[ed] the notion that continued contact with parents, even when the func-
tioning of the latter is marginal, is good for most foster children." Id. at 487.
186. For other studies reporting beneficial effects of parental visitation on children in
long term foster care see, for example, R. HOLMAN, TRADING IN CHILDREN 192-93, 201-02
(1973); S. IsAACS, THE CAMBRIDGE EVACUATION SURVEY (1941); G. TRAWLER, IN PLACE OF
PARENTS (1960); Jenkins, Long Term Fostering, 15 CASE CONF. 349 (1969); Lewis, Long Thne and
Temporaq Placement of Children, in SELECTED PAPERS IN CASEWORK (1951); Pringle & Clifford,
Conditions Associated with Emotional Maladjustment Among Children in Care, 14 EDUC. REV. 112
(1962); J. Gallop, Three Factors Affecting the Reactions of Children to Foster Family Care
(1972) (doctoral dissertation, Catholic University of America).
187. Two British studies have reported, however, that foster children with no contact
with their natural parents exhibited more problems than children with regular contact but less
problems than children with inf/equent, irregular parental contact. See R. HOLMAN, supra note
186, at 200-02 (children experienced "difficulties" with natural parents more often with infre-
quent contact than with "regular" (at least once a month) or no contact; this finding was
statistically significant for fostering arrangements made privately by natural parents but not
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psychology is so complex and studies contain so many uncontrolled
variables, we might hesitate to rely on any one of these studies. But
together they make a strong case that continued parental visitation
benefits children in long term foster care. Furthermore, none of the
studies that examined the children's perceptions about their place-
ments found that parental visitation decreased the likelihood that the
child would view his placement as permanent. For example, in the
Weinstein study, almost 90% of the children who were questioned
described their current placement as relatively permanent; over half
of these children had a parent who visited them regularly.'88 More-
over, the studies found that visitation benefited even those children
whose parents did not visit on a regular or frequent basis and were,
undoubtedly, sometimes inadequate.
Researchers have also reported that children with divorced par-
ents benefit from visitation by the noncustodial parent. Wallerstein
and Kelly, who conducted a detailed study of divorced families, re-
cently reported that a "good" relationship with the visiting parent
"appeared linked to high self-esteem and the absence of depression"
and that "boys and girls of various ages who had been doing poorly
at the initial assessment were likely to improve with increased visita-
tion . . " 189 Even when the parent-child relationship was "poor"
for fostering arrangements made by the state); Jenkins, supra note 186, at 349, 352 (35% of
children with "regular" (more often than every six months) parental contact found emotion-
ally disturbed, as compared to 57% of children with no contact and 65% of children with
"irregular" contact; of the 31 children with irregular contact, 5 had received only one visit
since placement). Although these results have not been corroborated by other research to
date, they deserve further study in order to determine how frequently visitation must occur in
order to retain its beneficial impact.
188. E. WEINSTEIN, supra note 177, at 35-36. Contrary to Weinstein's original hypothe-
sis, children did not exhibit "status anxiety" about the tenuous nature of their placements,
despite continued contact with their parents. Id. at 36. Other studies have also found that a
child's sense of permanence is not strongly correlated with the category of placement (i.e.,
foster versus adoptive):
Perception of permanence happens without legal sanctions. And it may be absent
even when legal sanctions are there-whether the child was in a legally permanent
placement, adoption, or returned home or was in a legally temporary foster care
made very little difference in his level of adjustment and health at the time of the
interview. Perception of permanence was the key.
A. KADUSHIN,upra note 23, at 389. Kadushin also reports that a 1975 study comparing
a group of children in long term foster care with a group in adoptive homes showed that
"there were no statistically significant differences in the functioning of the two groups of
parents nor in that of the two groups of children." Id More recently, Fanshel found that the
majority of children studied who had been in foster homes for an average of six years thought
of the foster home as their "real home." Most were "at peace with the current arrangement."
Id
189. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 152, at 219.
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or had deteriorated, Wallerstein and Kelly found visitation prefera-
ble to complete loss of contact. They found visitation undesirable
only when the parental relationship was physically or psychologically
destructive.' 90
Complementing these studies, modern psychoanalytic theory on
childhood personality development helps to explain the advantages
of continued contact with the natural parent. Psychologists now be-
lieve that the child's image of himself and the world is based on his
early interaction with parental figures.' 9 ' Thus, if the child perceives
his parent as cold and rejecting, his personality development and
self-esteem will suffer. 192 "For a healthy self-image, the child must
not be allowed to 'forget' but be helped to a beginning acceptance of
his parents."'193 Only those children who are helped to "regard their
parents as unable rather than unwanting, and their placement as
symbolizing worth rather than worthlessness"' t9 4 will be likely to at-
tain a feeling of self-worth.
Visitation and contact with the noncustodial parent can aid the
child both in forming a healthy self-image and in realistically assess-
ing the parental problems that necessitated placement. Without pa-
rental contact, the child will tend to base his impressions of the lost
parent solely on fantasy; some children may therefore idealize their
absent parents and dream about a future reunion.' 95 This can im-
190. Id. at 239.
191. See J. BOWLBY, supra note 161, at 208-09, 322-62, 369; E. JACOBSON, THE SELF
AND THE OBJECT WORLD 172 (1964); set also A. FREUD, NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY IN
CHILDHOOD 46-47, 50, 156-57; M. MAHLER, ON HUMAN SYMBIOSIS AND THE VICISSITUDES
OF INDIVIDUATION: VOLUME I INFANTILE PSYCHOSIS (1968); Winnicott, The Capacip to Be
Alone, 39 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 416, reprinted in D. WINNICOTT, THE MATURATION
PROCESSES AND THE FACILITATING ENVIRONMENT 29 (1965).
192. See S. COOPERSMITH, THE ANTECEDENTS OF SELF-ESTEEM (1967); R.F. PECK &
RJ. HAVIGHURST, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT. For a collection of
additional sources on this point, see note 191 supra.
193. Garrett, Developing the Conviction in the Foster Child that He is Worthwhile, in FOSTER
CARE IN QUESTION, supra note 47, at 22.
194. Id (quoting Rosner, Crisis of Self-Doubt, 23 (New York Child Welfare League of
America (196 1)); see also Littner, The Importance of the Natural Parents to the Child in Placement, 54
CHILD WELFARE 175, 178-81 (1975); Morisey, Continuum of Parent-Child Relationship in Foster
Care, in FOSTER CARE IN QUESTION, supra note 47, at 151-52, 154; Thorpe, supra note 182, at
94-98.
195. See Littner, supra note 194, at 177, 179; see also J. BOWLBY, supra note 157, at
124-25; Garrett, supra note 193 at 22. For similar views about children with divorced parents,
see J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 152, at 256.
This strong tendency of children to idealize their absent parents is both "a way to avoid
the pain associated with accepting the shortcomings of their parents. . .[and] a way for the
child to avoid feelings of devaluation and guilt resulting from whatever happened in the
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pede the child's ability to form realistic current relationships. 96
Conversely, the child may exaggerate the parent's faults. This can
hurt the child's own self-esteem, 97 since children tend to identify
with the image they hold of their parents. 98
The child's knowledge that the parent lives, but is unavailable,
also hinders his ability to effectively mourn his loss.' 99 Just as a child
often blames himself for the death of his parent, oster child may
blame either himself or his foster parent for the loss of contact with
his natural parent.2° ' Furthermore, a distorted parent-child relation-
ship, which often precedes the foster child's separation from his par-
ent, increases the likelihood that the child will have difficulty in
adequately mourning his loss.
20 2
Thus, visitation by natural parents can aid the child in elevating
home of [the] biological parents." Stein & Derdeyn, The Child in Group Foster Care, 19 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 90, 92-93 (1980).
196. The foster parents and the caseworker are often viewed as the persecutors who
stole the child from his loving parents and keep him from returning to his family.
This situation is more likely to arise when visitation is disallowed or otherwise lim-
ited. In directing the anger toward the foster parents, the child is remaining loyal to
his now idealized parent(s).
Stein & Derdeyn, supra note 195, at 93; see also Littner, supra note 194, at 178-81; note 209
infra and accompanying text.
197. See Littner, supra note 194, at 177; see also sources cited in notes 191-92, supra.
198. When a child has had living experiences with his natural parents, he identifies
with many of their personality traits. He carries images of his natural parents
within his own mind. They become, in effect, a part of the child. This occurs even
when the child has no conscious memories of his natural parents, e.g., when he is
placed away from his parents before the age of 6 years.
Littner, supra note 194, at 177; see also sources cited in notes 191-92 supra.
199. See E. FURMAN, A CHILD'S PARENT DIES 46-48 (1974). Furman concluded that
healthy mourning following a loss through separation poses particular difficulties for children,
which are not ameliorated by making the separation total:
[T]he continued total separation from the love object appeared to evoke a mourning
process, but its course was considerably affected by the ambiguous nature of the
reality: "I do not see him, but he is alive somewhere." Other factors, such as feel-
ings of rejection and guilt further complicated the picture.
Id at 47; see a/so Benedek & Benedek, supra note 141, at 260 (child's symptoms following
parental separation or divorce generally resemble those following parental death); Stein &
Derdeyn, supra note 195, at 96 (same).
200. In one study, no less than 40% of children and adolescents attributed their parent's
death either to themselves or to the surviving parent. See Arthur & Kemme, Bereavement in
Childhood, 51 CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PYSCHIATRY 37 (1964); see also J. BOWLBY, supra note
160, at 358-61 ("[N]othing is easier for a child than mistakenly to blame someone, including
himself, for having caused or contributed to a parent's death.").
201. See Littner, supra note 194, at 177; cf. Benedek & Benedek, supra note 141, at 260
(noting the same phenomenon about divorce).
202. One of the variables that Bowlby identifies as accounting for differences in chil-
dren's reactions to loss is "the patterns of relationship within the family prior to the loss, with
special reference to the patterns obtaining between the parents themselves and between each
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his self-esteem, understanding and coping with his parents' problems,
and effectively mourning the loss of his natural parents. Both psy-
choanalytic theory and empirical data suggest that a visiting parent
is better than no parent at all.
2. The advantages of visitation versus the dangers of conflict.
The advantages of visitation are complicated by antagonism be-
tween the natural and foster parents. Not surprisingly, researchers
have found that interparental hostilities can cause children to experi-
ence severe stress. 3  They have reported that a link exists between
psychological disturbance and active but irregular contact with a
parent who has strongly conflicting feelings about his child's place-
ment20 4 and that long term care itself may create loyalty conflicts for
some children.205 But despite the permanency program's suggestion
that terminating parental visitation will help the child with these
problems, 20 6 there is no evidence to support this view.2 0 7 Gone need
not mean forgotten.20 8 The child may still cling to an alliance with
the absent parent that prevents him from becoming deeply involved
in the foster home;2 9 he may feel abandoned and rejected. 1 Rather
of them and the bereaved child." J. BOWLBY,Supra note 160, at 31 1;seealso E. FURMAN, SUpra
note 199; I. GLICK, R. WEISS & C. PARKES, THE FIRST YEAR OF BEREAVEMENT (1974).
203. See, e.g., J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 152, at 49, 70-71 (discusses the
impact of interparental hostilities following divorce).
204. See J. BOWLBY, supra note 157, at 116.
205. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at 487-88.
206. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
207. Fanshel and Shinn reported that parental visitation significantly correlated with
identity conflict when considered alone but that, when all variables were considered simulta-
neously, the influence of visitation was markedly reduced and was no longer statistically sig-
nificant. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at 404-07. The most significant predictor of
identity conflicts was age at placement. Id.
208. There is evidence that parental visitation does not significantly affect identity con-
flicts. Fanshal and Shinn attempted to measure the extent to which children in long term
foster care "became caught up in conflicting emotions about . .. identity, wondering to
whom [they] . . . 'belonged,' and specifically, whether [they] . . .experienced conflicts in
loyalty to surrogate and natural parents." Id. at 405. They found that unvisited children
were more attached to their parents than visited children. Children placed at younger ages,
who thus had less preplacement experience with their parents, were also more attached to
their parents than children placed when older. Furthermore, the level of the younger chil-
dren's attachment increased after 21/2 years in foster care. These findings suggest that for many
children in foster care parental absence, rather than causing the child to forget the parent,
increases the parent's importance to the child. See id. at 402-05.
209. See, e.g., J. BOWLBY,Supra note 157, at 116; Littner,supra note 194, at 178-79; Stein
& Derdeyn, upra note 195, at 92-93. For a similar view about children of divorce, see J.
WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 189, at 248 (for many years, some children remained
unreconciled to separation, and wove elaborate erotic and heroic fantasies around absent
fathers).
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than resolving the child's problems, cessation of contact with the nat-
ural parent is likely only to bury them. As one pair of commentators
has stated,
[i]t is better for the child to have to cope with real parents who are
obviously flawed in their parental behavior, who bring a mixture of
love and rejection, than to reckon withfantasy parents who play an
undermining role on the deeper level of the child's subconscious. 211
This is not to say that parental visitation is appropriate in every
situation. Young children of extremely abusive parents may find pa-
rental visitation too threatening. Some parents with severe mental
disturbances may be incapable of meaningful interaction with their
children, and visits by some psychologically destructive parents may
do more harm to their children than good.212 Even in these cases,
however, rigidly proscribing visitation may not be the best approach:
The strength of the child's attachment could easily be underesti-
mated and inadvertently reinforced by the rigid proscription of vis-
iting. Unfortunately, the absolute prohibition of visiting with the
psychologically ill parent is as likely to strengthen the relationship
as to weaken it, and the well-intentioned strategy may boomerang
because children, out of their own intense need, can all too readily
idealize the parent they are prohibited from seeing.213
Even the children of emotionally disturbed parents may benefit more
from structured visitation that includes counseling than from simple
termination of contact.214 This approach at least offers the child the
210. See, eg., Littner, supra note 194, at 177; Stein and Derdeyn, supra note 195, at
90-9 1. For a similar view about children of divorce, see J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra
note 152, at 218 (an unvisited child is likely to feel rejected and unlovable).
211. D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at 489; see also E. WEINSTEIN, supra note 177,
at 69 (postulating that unvisited children had lowest well-being ratings because "unvisited
children may develop feelings of being unwanted by their natural parents and being some-
how inferior or unworthy because of this").
212. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 152, at 238-42 (following divorce,
some visiting relationships could be considered detrimental to development because they in-
fantilized the child, hurt his feelings, or exploited him for the benefit of the adult).
213. Id. at 256; see also J. BOWLBY, supra note 157, at 69 ("The attachment of children to
parents who by all ordinary standards are very bad parents is a never-ceasing source of won-
der to those who seek to help them. Even when they are with kindly foster-parents these
children feel their roots to be in the homes where, perhaps, they have been neglected and ill-
treated, and keenly resent criticism directed against their parents.").
214. See J. BOWLBY, supra note 157, at 120 (suggesting joint counseling when loyalty
conflicts arise); D. KLINE & H. OVERSTREET, supra note 165, at 112-13, 151-53 (the presence
of a caseworker during parental visits can ease the foster child's stress). For similar views
concerning postdivorce visits by noncustodial parents, see Benedek & Benedek, supra note 141,
at 264-65, 267; Futterman, Child Psychology Perspectives: After the "Civilized" Divorce, 19 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 525 (1980).
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opportunity to understand his parent's inadequacies and thus avoid
self-blame.
Finally, that visitation may produce loyalty conflicts which out-
weigh its advantages in certain individual cases could not justify gen-
erally denying visitation for children in long term foster care. As we
have seen, researchers have uniformly found that visitation benefits
most children in long term foster care. If visitation with natural par-
ents usually causes loyalty conflicts that outweigh the advantages of
continued contact for these children, the researchers should have re-
ported the opposite conclusion. Thus, damaging loyalty conflicts ap-
pear to be the exception rather than the rule for foster children. And
careful selection of foster parents as well as foster parent training that
emphasizes the advantages of the child's development of a realistic
relationship with his natural parent could substantially reduce any
risks of conflict created by visitation.
21 5
On balance, then, the risks of interparent conflict, even when
coupled with the reality that some foster children have destructive or
emotionally troubled parents, do not justify the permanency pro-
gram. Instead, the evidence, taken as a whole, confirms what per-
haps should be obvious. As John Bowlby put it:
[Children] are not slates from which the past can be rubbed off
with a duster or sponge, but human beings who carry their previous
experiences with them and whose behavior in the present is pro-
foundly affected by what has gone before. [The evidence] confirms
.. . the deep emotional significance of the parent-child tie which,
though it can be greatly distorted, is not to be expunged by mere
physical separation. Finally, it confirms the knowledge that it is
always easier for a human being to adapt effectively to something
of which he has direct experience than to something which is ab-
sent and imagined."t6
D. Children Who Are Adopted
Studies of adopted children highlight the continuing importance
of the absent parent to the child in placement. Some of these studies
have reported that adopted children suffer from the same problems
215. See Thorpe, supra note 182, at 95 (reporting that when natural and foster parents
accepted each other, the foster children appeared to experience no conflict in loyalties and
accepted the foster situation with equanimity). For discussions of the importance of foster
parent training aimed at enabling the foster parents to accept the child's relationship with his
natural parents, see D. KLINE & H. OVERsTREET, supra note 165, at 255-56; Garrett, supra
note 193, at 23; Littner, supra note 194, at 181. Under current practices, foster parents gener-
ally receive little or no training or preparation. See note 36 supra.
216. J. BOWLBY, supra note 157, at 113-14.
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of confused identity, insecurity, and guilt that beset children in long
term foster care.217 For example, after interviewing 200 adults who
had been adopted as children, one researcher concluded that:
The picture that they almost universally gave was of a child strug-
gling, alone, with overwhelming confusions and insecurities. They
described themselves as isolated, insecure, lonely, usually obedient
and well-behaved, different-and often disturbed. They reported
that they did, and still do, lack self-confidence, self-esteem and a
solid sense of identity.
21
Other studies report that some adopted children have the same
persistent fantasies about their natural parents as do some foster chil-
dren.219 Some adopted children also experience insecurities in their
217. For a general discussion of the psychological problems confronting adopted chil-
dren, see American Academy of Pediatrics, Comm. on Adoptions, Identity Development in
Adopted Children, 47 PEDIATRICS 948 (1971) [hereinafter cited as American Academy];
Schwam & Tuskan, The Adopted Child, in 1 BASIC HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 342 U.
Noshpitz ed. 1979). It is unclear whether adoptees have a higher rate of mental disturbance
than the general population. Studies have reported above-average psychiatric hospital ad-
mission rates for adoptees. See, e.g., Schechter, Carlson, Simmons & Work, Emotional Problems
in the Adoptee, 10 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 109 (1964); Simon & Senturia, Adoption and
Psychiatric Illness, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 858, 867 (1966). But, some have questioned the
validity of these figures and their utility in measuring rates of emotional disturbance. See
Taylor & Starr, The Use of Clinical Services by Adoptive Parents, I 1J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIA-
TRY 384, 386 (1972).
There is no available data comparing the emotional disturbance rate of adoptees to that
of foster children. There have been reports that foster children, like adoptees, have a high
incidence of behavioral and emotional problems, see D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at
10-16 (survey of reports), but Fanshel and Shinn found that the emotional impairment rate
of 25-33% in the foster children they examined was "quite in line" with data on children
from similar social circumstances who were not in foster care, see id at 494-95.
218. Lawrence, Inside, Looking Out of Adoption (1976) (paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Psychological Association), quoted in A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R.
PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 138 (1979); see also American Academy, supra note 217,
at 948 (adopted children experience emotional stress and have difficulty developing self-iden-
tity); Sorosky, Baran & Pannor, Identity Conficts i Adoptees, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 18
(1975) (reviewing literature, authors report that adoptees are more vulnerable to identity
problems than is the population at large); Toussieng, Thoughts Regarding the Etiology of Pycho-
logical Diftulties bn Adopted Children, 41 CHILD WELFARE 59, 65 (1962) (adopted children are
more prone to emotional disturbances and personality disorders than are nonadopted
children).
219. See Schechter, Carlson, Simmons & Work, supra note 217, at 116 (45% of emotion-
ally disturbed adoptees had "noticeable overt fantasies about natural parents" that "often led
to active seqarching in young adulthood for the natural parent"); Schwam & Tuskan, supra
note 217, at 343 ("many [adopted] children fantasize themselves as step children with ideal-
ization of the fantasied biological parents"); see also Clothier, The Psychology of the Adopted
Child, 27 MENTAL HYGIENE 222, 230 (1943); Schechter, Observations on Adopted Children, 3
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 21 (1960). For children adopted in early infancy into stable,
harmonious family situations, however, fantasies about their natural parents tend to be ex-
tremely negative rather than idealized and may be accompanied by guilt feelings. See
Schwartz, The Family Romance Fantasy in Children Adopted in Infany, 49 CHILD WELFARE 386,
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relationships with their adoptive parents: In one sample, 70% of the
adoptees stated that their adoptive parents used the fact of adoption
to manipulate their behavior. 220 Regardless of whether adoptive par-
ents actually exploit the child's status in this way, these adoptees'
statements strongly suggest that adoption, by itself, does not resolve
the insecurity that derives from not "belonging" to a natural par-
22ent.21 In fact, for some adoptees, identity conflicts and feelings of
not "belonging" continue into adulthood. Motivated by the desire to
find their biological roots, these adult adoptees may spend years
searching for the natural parents they have never met.222
Research also indicates that the severity of adoptees' emotional
problems generally correlates with both their age at adoption and
the extent of early maternal deprivation. 223  The child who is
adopted at birth into a good home thus has the best chance of escap-
ing later psychological problems. Such a child has no memories of
his natural parents and, in his earliest years, perhaps no knowledge
that they even exist.
By contrast, the vast majority of foster children have lived with,
and have memories of, their natural parents. Usually, the parent-
child relationship will have been disrupted by family breakdown or
inadequate parental care. Adoption by itself cannot resolve the emo-
tional problems that these experiences produce. Thus, as older chil-
dren with more substantial ties to their natural parents have moved
into the adoption "marketplace," failed adoptions--children who are
returned by their prospective adoptive parents-have increased.224
390 (1970); see also notes 195-98 supra and accompanying text (discusses tendency of children
in foster care to idealize their absent natural parents).
220. Lawrence, supra note 218, at 138.
221. See Schwam & Tuskan, supra note 217, at 343 (adopted child may fear being given
away again).
222. See A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R. PANNOR, supra note 218, at 114-38 (1979). For
an account of several such searches, see B. LIFTON, LOST AND FOUND (1979).
223. See, e.g., Humphrey & Ounsted, Adoptive Families Re/erredfor Psychiatric Advice, I" The
Children, 109 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 599, 604-05 (1963) (children adopted after six months of
age are more likely to exhibit symptoms of disturbed social behavior, stealing, cruelty, de-
structiveness, and lying); Jameson, P.yschiatric Disorder in Adopted Children in Texas, 63 TEX.
MED. 83 (1967) (greater incidence of severe psychiatric illness in children adopted after in-
fancy); Offord, Aponte & Cross, Presenting Symptomatology of Adopted Children, 20 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 110, 116 (1969) ("[t]he later the age of adoption, the greater the frequency
and severity of antisocial behavior"); see also S. WOLFF, CHILDREN UNDER STRESS 107-08
(2d ed. 1981) (child's age is a main factor associated with the adoption outcome). But cf.
Schwam & Tuskan, supra note 217, at 346 (it is unclear whether these studies can be genera-
lized throughout adopted population).
224. See Bass, Matchmaker-Matchmaker: Older Child Adoption Failures, 54 CHILD WELFARE
505, 506-07 (1975). There is evidence that older children and emotionally disturbed children
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The child's natural parent and his previous family experiences
remain important even if he lives in a loving permanent home. The
child must somehow come to terms with his past, and the available
evidence suggests that he is better able to do so if his natural parent
remains a live presence rather than a fantasy.
E. The Current Realities of Foster Care
The current realities of foster care placement render the perma-
nency program's reliance on adoption and the termination of paren-
tal rights even more questionable. Over the last ten years, the
average age of foster children has increased, as has the average age at
placement. For example, in New York State, the mean age of chil-
dren in care rose from less than 8.7 in 1970 to 11.8 in 1980; in 1982
the largest age group among the foster care population was 14 to 17
years old.2 25 More than half of the New York children who entered
long term foster care in 1979 were nine years old or older. 26 Chil-
dren this age hardly can be expected simply to forget their natural
parents and start over; by this point, ties and identifications are
much too firmly established.
Moreover, termination of parental rights by no means ensures a
child a more stable placement. In 1980, 75% of the children "free"
for adoption in New York City had been free for more than one
year.227 These children had lost their natural parents but had not
gained a more permanent parental substitute. The problem they
confronted was not loyalty conflicts but the absence of any firm pa-
rental tie.
The permanency program standards implicitly presume that
these children are better off without their natural parents.228 But this
constitute an increasingly larger proportion of foster care cases. See B. BERNSTEIN, D. SNIDER
& W. MEEZAN, supra note 35, at 6-7, 30, 32; A. GRUBER, SUpra note 4, at 9-11, 33-36; see also
notes 225-26 infra and accompanying text (discusses the rising age of adopted children).
225. New York State Dep't of Social Services, Press Release (June 24, 1982); see also J.
KNIT'ZER & M. ALLEN, supra note 1, at 186 (according to a 1976 national survey, 51% of the
children in out-of-home care were 12 or older, and 31% were 15 or older).
226. New York State Child Welfare Information Service, Summary of Characteristics of
Children in Care or Recently Discharged (Sept. 30, 1980).
227. Id.
228. Some of the proposed permanency program standards attempt to ensure that the
rights of only truly inadequate parents will be terminated by coupling restrictive removal
grounds with their liberal termination grounds. See, e.g., GFS II, supra note 117, at 193-96;
ABA STANDARDS I, supra note 89, at §§ 6.4(c), 8.3, 8.4. The idea is, apparently, that if re-
moval standards are tighter, and if preventive services are made more widely available, the
risks of termination for parents will be very low. What this approach overlooks, however, is
history, which suggests that state support for preventative services will not be sufficient to
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presumption is no more than a modern variant of the nineteenth cen-
tury child rescue fantasy. 29 It is unsupported by any evidence and
simply ignores the important role that parents of children in long
term foster care can and do play in their children's emotional
development.
Moreover, the permanency program standards completely fail to
address the causes of foster care drift.230 The standards provide no
incentives toward improving the stability of foster care placement 23
or the quality of foster care.232 Rather, by espousing termination of
parental rights as the answer to foster care drift, the permanency pro-
gram provides yet another excuse for continuing to deliver poor serv-
ices to parents and foster children.233
Termination of parental rights is not necessary to provide chil-
dren in foster care with stable, loving homes; continuity of care can
be ensured through permanent custody arrangements that, unlike
adoption, do not disrupt parental visitation. Moreover, the perma-
nency program's solution to the problem of foster care drift will
probably hurt the interests of foster children more than it will help
them. The program will deprive many children of the benefits of
keep the bulk of children placed voluntarily out of foster care. Nor is it clear that all of these
children should be out of foster care. Many family problems-serious mental illness, incarcer-
ation, uncontrollable behavior by the child- require substitute care; supportive services will
be insufficient to satisfy the family's needs.
229. See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
230. See notes 18-43 supra and accompanying text.
231. For example, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit permit a "Long Time Caretaker" (an
adult who has continuously cared for the child for one or more years if the child was under
three at the time of placement or two or more years if the child was three or older at the time
of placement) to contest removing the child from their home. But neither the parent nor the
child has standing to contest a movepr'or to this time. See GFS II, supra note 118, at 188-95.
The other model standards, see notes 128-39supra and accompanying text, also fail to address
this issue.
232. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit do urge "the development of procedures and opportu-
nities in temporary placement for maintaining relationships between child and absent par-
ent," GFS I, supra note 8, at 39, and they assert that "[tihe goal of Temporary Foster Care is
to maintain the child's ties to his parents and to assure their reunion as quickly as possible
. " GFS II, supra note 118, at 190. Yet, they propose no standards to ensure adequate
foster care services. See id. at 189-90. Nor do the other model permanency program stan-
dards generally address the quality of foster care. For the one exception, see ABA STAN-
DARDS I, supra note 89, §§ 6.5B, 6.6., 7.1-7.3, 7.5, at 28-30 (providing for periodic court
review of placement, development of service plans, interim reports on service provision, and
appointment of a grievance officer to receive complaints from foster children and parents).
233. Indeed, a national commission, inspired by the permanency program philosophy,
recently recommended eight improvements in the foster care system; only one dealt with the
quality of foster care itself. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8. Even
that one recommendation-for payment of fair reimbursement to foster parents-would have
no impact on the quality or delivery of services to natural parents.
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parental visitation, but will give the child welfare system no incentive
to improve the practices that produce drift itself.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW STANDARD
In view of the available evidence on the benefits of parental visi-
tation, I reject the permanency program standards and propose a
new standard for parental rights termination. This standard distin-
guishes termination-the denial of visitation and other ancillary pa-
rental privileges-from a denial of custody rights.234 Under this
standard, a court may not consider termination unless it has first de-
prived the natural parent of legal custody and appointed a perma-
nent guardian 23 5 in his stead. Even then, the court may not
terminate other parental rights unless it finds that the child would
suffer specific, significant harm which cannot be averted by any less
drastic alternative.
Section A, below, examines criteria for evaluating a termination
standard and their application to the proposed standard. Section B
examines the standard in practice, including its application to three
typical problem cases. Section C describes limitations on what the
standard can be expected to accomplish. The standard itself is set
out in detail in the Appendix.
A. Crteria for a Termination Standard
A termination standard should reflect several different considera-
tions. Below, I examine each of these considerations and compare
how the proposed standard, the traditional standard based on paren-
tal unfitness, and the permanency program standards address
them.2 36
234. Discussion of the grounds on which a parent should be permanently deprived of
custody is beyond the scope of this article; the proposed standard therefore does not specify
the basis for permanent custody denial.
235. While I have referred to the permanent custodian of the child as a guardian, there
is no reason why a legislature could not employ the term open adoption instead of guardian-
ship. See note 104supra and accompanying text. As the term adoption probably connotes, in
general parlance, a closer and more permanent tie than does guardianship, use of the term
open adoption might be psychologically advantageous to children and their prospective
guardians. I have used the term guardianship herein simply to avoid confusion with adoption
in its classic sense.
236. The first two criteria that are considered-adherence to the goals of the child wel-
fare system and conformity with the available evidence on child development-I deem fun-
damentally important. The next two-providing uniform treatment of similar problems that
arise in termination and divorce proceedings and avoiding adverse resource effects-I con-
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1. Child protection: the basic goal
The state's authority to intervene in family life ultimately derives
from its parens patriae power to promote and protect the welfare of
minor children.237 Most commentators now agree that before the
state significantly interferes with the parent-child relationship, it
should show that the child will suffer harm in the absence of inter-
vention.2 38 Accordingly, courts typically require a showing that the
child will otherwise suffer harm before overruling parental decisions
about a child's medical care, 3 9 education,240 or general upbring-
ing.24t Similarly, recent model neglect standards prohibit removal of
a child from his parents' home without a demonstration that harm to
the child cannot be averted by any less drastic alternative.242
sider significant but secondary concerns. The last factor-behavioral effects on natural par-
ents and foster care agencies-I consider a fairly minor consideration.
237. The state's child protection orparenspatriae power originated as an equitable con-
cept applied by the chancery courts to property or guardianship disputes between private
parties. Since the early nineteenth century, American courts have invoked parenspatriae au-
thority in both the public and the private law contexts. For a history and discussion of the
parenspat'ae concept, see Areen, supra note 52, at 894-917; Deoelopments in the Law---the Consti-
tution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1221-42 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Dev'elopments].
238. See, e.g., Areen, supra note 52, at 919 ("Parental misconduct should justify state
intervention only if it has a negative impact on the children."); Mnookin, supra note 8, at 628
("Removal should be [permitted] only when the child cannot be protected in the home.");
Wald, supra note 18, at 1037 ("intervention [should be] . ..permitted only in cases where a
child evidences serious physical or emotional damage'); see also GFS II, supra note 118, at 24
("the degree of intrusion on family integrity at each stage of decision should be no greater
than that which is necessary to fulfill the function of the decision').
239. Compare In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 649, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979)
(courts may not choose the most effective treatment when parents have chosen among reason-
able alternatives) and In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 348, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (1972) (state may not
override a parental judgment about medical care that is based on religious belief when the
child's life is not immediately imperiled) with In re Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 752,
379 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (1978) (ordering chemotherapy when the child's life was at stake and
the parents were unwilling "to provide the type of medical care which was necessary and
proper for their child's well-being'). But see In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918,
328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (court ordered nonvital operation over parent's religious objection).
See generally Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk.: On State Supervention of Parental Auton-
omy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977).
240. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
241. The Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right of parents to control the
care and upbringing of their children free from unjustified state interference. See, e.g., Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); cf. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For discussion of the scope of parental rights under the Consti-
tution, see Developments, supra note 237, at 1235-38, 1351-57 (1980); Note, Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Scope of State Child Neglect Statutes, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 722-27 (1979).
242. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS I, supra note 89, § 6.4(c) commentary at 123; NAC
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By contrast, the unfitness standard traditionally used in termina-
tion proceedings focuses on parental conduct rather than on the
child's needs.243 There is no valid justification for applying a child-
focused standard to the original state intervention or foster care
placement but not applying a similar standard to termination; the
goal of child protection requires examining the child's needs in both
contexts. A termination standard should therefore focus on whether
termination will serve the child's interests not on whether the parents
deserve to be punished.
The permanency program standards mark an improvement over
the traditional unfitness standard because they explicitly establish
the child's interest as the paramount value.244 Most of these stan-
dards, however, fail to pursue this value with sufficient ardor. While
they ostensibly promote permanence, they permit termination with-
out any showing that it is necessary to provide the child with a stable
placement; they do not require the court to consider alternatives,
such as guardianship, that would assure the child a permanent sub-
stitute parent without termination.245 Under many of these stan-
dards, the court need not even find that the child will benefit as a
result of termination. Termination is typically permitted without
any showing that the child's present foster parents are prepared to
adopt him, or that any permanent home is currently available.246
Thus, a child may lose his natural parents without gaining anything
in return.
By contrast, the proposed standard, like those now applied to jus-
tify removal of the child from his natural home or interference with
parental decisionmaking, requires courts to tailor the fact-finding
process to focus on the child's needs. The court must consider alter-
natives short of termination and may not order termination unless
the child has already been placed in a permanent home. The stan-
dard thus ensures that the state will not deprive a child of his parents
STANDARDS, supra note 129, § 3.184 commentary at 344-45; GFS II, supra note 118, at
191-92; see also Areen, supra note 52, at 936; Wald, supra note 18, at 1039-40.
243. In 1975, parental conduct was still the focus of most state termination standards.
The grounds for termination most frequently found in termination standards were abandon-
ment (37 jurisdictions), neglect (35 jurisdictions), and parents' moral unfitness (20 jurisdic-
tions). Only 16 jurisdictions considered the child's best interests. See Katz, Howe &
McGrath, supra note 13, at 47-49, 66-67.
244. See text accompanying notes 112, 131 supra.
245. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
246. See notes 138-39 supra and accompanying text. This is not true of the Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit proposals.
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unless this step is actually necessary to protect his interest and unless
it has guaranteed him a substitute relationship in return.
2. Confomity with evidence on child development.
The standard I propose also satisfies the criteria suggested by the
available psychological data. The data suggest three such criteria.
First, because natural parents continue to be significant to a child
long after he has been separated from them, the law should distin-
guish the decision to terminate parental visitation rights from the
custody decision. Under the proposed standard, a permanent depri-
vation of custody does not automatically deprive the natural parent
of the right to visitation and other contact with the child. Rather, it
permits termination only when it can be shown that the exercise of
these rights will harm the child.
Second, because continuing contact between parent and child
generally correlates with higher levels of well-being for the child than
does lack of contact,24 7 the parent-child relationship should be sev-
ered only as a last resort. The proposed standard follows this ap-
proach and mandates that a court explore alternatives short of
termination-such as mandatory counseling and supervised visita-
tion-before it considers termination.
Finally, because the benefits, optimal frequency, and most desira-
ble types of visitation vary according to the situation, courts should
make termination decisions on an individualized basis. In some
cases, supervised visitation, perhaps accompanied by counseling, will
most benefit the child;248 in other cases, supervision and counseling
will be unnecessary. Sometimes weekend visits at a parent's home
will be appropriate; other times visits should occur at a foster home
or other location. And, in some cases-for example, when the parent
is extremely disturbed or violent-the risks of visitation in any form
will outweigh the potential benefits of continued contact. The pro-
posed standard again satisfies this criterion of individual treatment.
By contrast, neither the traditional unfitness test nor the perma-
nency programstandards satisfy any of these criteria. The unfitness
test makes parental conduct the sole basis for the termination deci-
sion; the permanency program standards generally presume termina-
tion to be beneficial to the interests of children in long term foster
care.
247. See notes 169-202 supra and accompanying text.
248. See notes 213-14 supra and accompanying text.
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3. Divorce decisions and termination decisions: Private fami law and
the family law of the poor.
The private law standards which govern postdivorce custody and
visitation already comport with the available psychological evidence
on the nature of the parent-child relationship and its impact on child
development. In marked contrast to the child welfare system's tradi-
tional disdain for the natural parent,249 private family law has con-
sistently recognized the importance of the child-parent relationship.
An award of custody to one divorcing parent does not automatically
deprive the other of the right of visitation and other contact; com-
plete denial of visitation is extremely rare and is seen as a last re-
sort, 25 and decisions about visitation are made on an individualized
basis. 25 ' Because divorce law generally conforms to the criteria that
a termination standard should satisfy, judicial decisions and experi-
ence in the divorce context could provide a rich resource for a court
deciding termination cases.
Recognizing that divorce and termination are related problems
could also help to bring child welfare law-the "family law of the
poor '"252 -into alignment with private family law. Such a realign-
ment would provide long overdue recognition that poor families,
who are disproportionately forced to turn to the child welfare system
for help because they lack alternatives,253 should be judged under the
same standards as all other citizens.
The traditional unfitness standard and the permanency program
are markedly different from those applied in divorce cases, while the
proposed standard is quite similar. The proposed standard, unlike
the others, offers the opportunity to create a link between public and
private family law.
4. Resource effects.
Turning to more practical concerns, a termination standard
249. See notes 50-62 supra and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., Devine v. Devine, 213 Cal. App. 2d 549, 29 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1963); Eliza-
beth A.S. v. Anthony M.S., 435 A.2d 721, 724 (Del. Super. Ct. 198 1); see also Henszey, Visita-
tion by a Non-Custodial Parent: What Is the "Best Interests" Doctrine?, 15 J. FAM. L. 213, 215 (1977)
("[o]nly under extreme and unusual circumstances will visitation be totally denied"); Annot.,
88 A.L.R.2d 148, § 3(c) (1963) (same).
251. See, e.g., Gantner v. Gantner, 39 Cal. 2d 272, 277, 246 P.2d 923, 928 (1952) ("[ifn
each [divorce] case, the trial judge must determine what is in the best interests of the
children").
252. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
253. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
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should not seriously strain the resources-financial, judicial, and pa-
rental-available for children in need of care away from their natu-
ral parents.
Financial resources. Foster care is costly. In 1977, the maintenance
of a child in foster care in New York City cost $4,900 per year.25 4
Proponents of the permanency program have therefore claimed as
one of its advantages the savings that would accrue from the in-
creased use of adoption:255 Traditionally, the state has not paid a
penny for the maintenance of adopted children, and even when sub-
sidized adoption exists, it costs much less than foster care.256
The proposed standard would, however, effect these same sav-
ings. Like adoption, the appointment of a permanent guardian
would put an end to costly foster care services and payments to foster
parents. And just as the state now often subsidizes adoptions, it
could also make subsidies available to guardians who could not
otherwise afford the full cost of maintaining a child.257
Judicial resources. The proposed standard might require a higher
expenditure of judicial resources than the traditional unfitness test or
permanency program standards. Under both of the latter standards,
after a parent's rights are terminated, he has no legally enforceable
claim to visitation or contact with the child. He therefore has no
reason to go to court. Under the proposed standard, however, many
parents who permanently lose custody would retain visitation rights,
creating the possibility of subsequent judicial proceedings to enforce
or modify the original visitation plan.25
254. Public Assistance Legislative Recommendations: Hearings on HR. 7200 Before the Subcomm.
on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 282 (1977) (statement of Carol J. Parry) [hereinafter cited as Public Assistance
Legislative Recommendations].
255. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF FINANCE, A REVIEW OF THE CALIFORNIA ADOP-
TION PROGRAM 52 (1974), quoted in Bodenheimer, supra note 96, at 38 ("a reduction of 3,000
children in the foster home population would result in an overall $81,000,000 savings to the
State over a 15 year period"); NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (10,000
children removed from foster care for adoption would result in $1.3 billion savings over ten
years); D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, DOLLARS AND SENSE IN THE FOSTER CARE OF CHILDREN:
A LOOK AT COST FACTORS 24-25 (1972) (savings from adoption of 17 children estimated at
$1,132,098).
256. In New York City in 1977, subsidized adoption cost $2,550; foster care cost $4,900.
See Public Assistance Legislative Recommendations, supra note 254, at 282.
257. Such a subsidy program is desirable because, .under current law, a guardian is
ineligible to receive federal foster care reimbursement. See 42 U.S.C. § 672 (Supp. IV 1980).
258. The case-by-case adjudication required under the proposed standard would also
consume more time than adjudication under Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's proposals, which
require the court simply to determine whether the requisite number of years in foster care
have passed. See GFS II, supra note 118, at 188-89, 194-95. It is not clear, however, whether
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However, such cases probably would not consume a substantial
amount of judicial resources. The available evidence suggests that
judicial modification of visitation plans is unnecessary in the major-
ity of divorce cases.259 Given that guardians and natural parents are
less likely to have a history of personal conflict, even fewer guardian-
ship cases should require subsequent judicial intervention. Further-
more, those cases that do require further court action generally
would involve simple, uncontested facts-for example, an intended
move by a parent or guardian-which could be adjudicated without
extensive proceedings. Lastly, all guardianship cases would involve
fact patterns familiar to courts that have handled divorce litigation;
the courts' deliberations would be guided by an already developed
case law.
Parent resources. The most essential resource for the child welfare
system is an adequate supply of dedicated individuals with the skills
to become successful substitute parents, both for children in need of
foster care-who will ultimately return to their natural parents-and
for children in need of permanent care. Partly because of a decline
in the number of adoptable infants, recent years have seen a substan-
tial increase in the number of individuals willing to adopt older fos-
ter children.260 Some of these individuals, however, would
undoubtedly be less inclined to take a child who will maintain a rela-
tionship with his natural parent.
On balance, however, the proposed standard is unlikely to have
any serious impact on the supply of individuals willing to become
permanent substitute parents to former foster children. An individ-
ual who contemplates becoming a guardian is likely to be concerned
about both the practical and psychological effects of a child's contin-
uing relationship with a natural parent. On a practical level, the
potential guardian may be concerned that the natural parent could
prevent him from moving, changing jobs, or taking other steps that
it would consume more time than adjudication under the other permanency program model
acts, which involve varying levels of adjudicatory complexity. See notes 128-39 supra and
accompanying text. I believe the benefits of individualized determinations that focus on the
child's needs outweigh any additional costs.
259. See Benedek & Benedek, supra note 141, at 258; Westman, Cline, Swift & Kranen,
Role of Child ychiaty in Divorce, 23 ARCHIvEs GEN. PYSCHIATRY 416 (1970). But see Cline &
Westman, The Impact of Divorce on the Family, 2 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUMAN DEv. 78 (1971)
(in 52% of 102 sample cases, hostile interaction between parents required court intervention).
260. See notes 86-99 supra and accompanying text; cf. A. SOROSKY, A. BARAN & R.
PANNOR, supra note 218, at 207 ("[i]n recent years. . . retarded and handicapped children
have been accepted more readily by adoptive parents because of the shortage of healthy
[adoptable] babies").
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would adversely affect the parent's visitation rights. To alleviate
these concerns and avoid unnecessary litigation, the proposed stan-
dard provides that neither the state nor a natural parent may pro-
hibit a permanent guardian from changing his residence, work, or
other activities in order to enforce existing visitation rights, unless
there is a showing of exceptional circumstances. 26' This clear specifi-
cation of rights-which is similar, although somewhat more deferen-
tial, to the interests of the guardian than that typically employed in
divorce litigation-should suffice to alleviate most of the potential
guardian's practical concerns. 26
2
A potential guardian may also be concerned about the psycholog-
ical impact of a child's continuing relationship with his natural par-
ents: Will the parent be a bad influence on the child, interfere with
child discipline and child rearing decisions, or perhaps even turn the
child against the guardian? For the many prospective guardians who
have also served as the child's foster parent and thus have had actual
experience with parental visitation, these questions probably will not
represent a major concern. These individuals will have developed a
relationship with a specific child whom they wish to keep. Through-
out that relationship, they probably had no choice but to accept the
child's relationship with his natural parent. Therefore, not many
prospective guardians are likely to reject the guardianship role sim-
ply because of the prospect of continuing visitation to which they
already have become accustomed. Indeed, some foster parents ap-
parently prefer to keep their foster child under a long term foster care
contract or other arrangement which maintains the visitation status
261. A court should not infer exceptional circumstances merely from a showing that the
guardian will derive no financial gain from the change. A court, however, could find excep-
tional circumstances upon a showing that the proposed change was substantially motivated
by a desire to frustrate visitation or that it would be seriously detrimental to the child.
262. On this issue, the proposed standard is somewhat more deferential to the guard-
ian's interests than the standard usually employed following divorce. In that instance, modi-
fication of a custody order permitting a move to another jurisdiction typically is sanctioned
only when the petitioning parent can show that the interests ofthe children would be advanced
by the move. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 600-01 (1968). Some courts
have even required the custodial parent to show more than augmentation of the child's inter-
ests. See, e.g., Priebe v. Priebe, 81 A.D.2d 746, 438 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 1981), aJ'd, 55
N.Y.2d 997, 434 N.E.2d 708, 449 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1982) (exceptional circumstances required to
warrant disruption of relationship between children and father). Courts have been particu-
larly reluctant to sanction moves when the noncustodial parent is able and willing to assume
custody. See, e.g., Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 320 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1982) (because an award of
sole custody would have permitted mother to take her child abroad permanently to join her
husband, the court granted father custody in the United States during school year).
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quo rather than to adopt him. 2 63
Fears of parental interference undoubtedly will influence persons
who do not have a preexisting relationship with a specific child to a
greater extent; certainly, many of these individuals would prefer
adoption. But given the current dearth of children available for
adoption, this preference probably would not dissuade significant
numbers of individuals from becoming permanent guardians.264
5. Behavioral side effects on parents and foster care agencies.
The standard a court employs in deciding whether to terminate
parental rights will necessarily have some impact on the behavior of
natural parents and child welfare agencies while the child is in foster
care. The termination standard tells these parties what the law ex-
pects of them if they wish to obtain, or to avoid, termination. A
termination standard should take account of these behavioral side
effects, and to the extent possible, avoid encouraging undesirable
parent or agency behavior.
Natural parents. Under traditional child welfare law, and even
more so under the permanency program, the child welfare agency
may threaten to terminate a natural parent's rights in order to in-
duce him to make the changes in his behavior that the agency be-
lieves necessary for him to regain custody. Conceivably, if natural
parents knew that they would be permitted to continue visitation
even after they lost all possibility of ever regaining custody, this in-
263. See, e.g., Beaudoin v. McBain, 115 Misc. 2d 158, 453 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Fam. Ct. 1982)
(awarding custody of three children to foster parents who did not wish to adopt them for
reasons other than financial need).
264. Since no American jurisdiction frequently employs permanent guardianship like
that proposed here or open adoption, ultimately one can do little more than guess about how
many people would be willing to make a permanent commitment to become parents to a
foster child only if they are guaranteed that they can deny natural parents the visitation that
traditional adoption permits. I believe that there would not be a significant number of peo-
ple in this category for two reasons. First, because of the current lack of chidren outside the
foster care system available for traditional adoption, prospective adoptive parents would be
forced to choose between allowing natural parents visitation and delaying adoption for four
to five years or perhaps even forgoing it entirely. Second, the proposed standard provides
guardians considerable protection against unreasonable interference by natural parents: Not
only does the proposed standard permit the guardian to change his residence or employment
except on a showing of exceptional circumstances, but it also ensures that a natural parent
cannot regain custody after a guardian's appointment, see note 275 in/a and accompanying
text, and that parental visitation may be curtailed if it causes significant harm to the child, see
notes 278-84 infra and accompanying text; see also notes 195-96 supra and accompanying text
(discussing ways to deal with conflicts between guardians and natural parents).
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centive to change their behavior during the initial years of foster care
would be diminished.
There is no evidence, however, that threats of terminating paren-
tal rights actually improve the behavior of parents of children in fos-
ter care. The probability of discharge from care has been linked to a
variety of factors,26 5 but not to the existence or severity of agency
threats. On the contrary, the foster care literature emphasizes that a
nonpunitive working alliance with the natural parent is necessary to
help him change his behavior. 266 Researchers have also found that
parents who perceive their child care agency as unhelpful and as op-
posing their reunification with their child are less frequent visitors
and are less likely ever to regain custody.267 The proposed standard
thus should have little, if any, detrimental impact on parental
behavior.
Foster care agencies. Judges have sometimes refused to terminate
parental rights when an agency has failed to provide any help or
services to a parent whom it now claims to be unfit ever to regain
custody. 268 This mechanism enables courts to hold agencies at least
265. Factors correlating with the probability of discharge include the reason for place-
ment, parental visitation, agency evaluation of the parent, caseworker activity, ethnicity, and
the age of the child at the time he was placed. See D. FANSHEL & E. SHINN, supra note 4, at
112-30; E. SHERMAN, R. NEUMAN & A. SHYNE, supra note 4, at 60-61; Fanshel, Parental
Failure and Consequences for Children: The Drug Abusing Mother Whose Children Are in Foster Care, 65
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 604 (1975). No foster care studies describe either the effectiveness or the
frequency with which child welfare agencies use the threat of termination.
266. See, e.g., D. KLINE & H. OVERSTREET, supra note 165, at 160-63 (1972) (parent is
likely to feel distrustful, afraid, and hostile in his relationships with adults who represent
authority and needs a nonpunitive atmosphere in which his provocations are not taken at face
value); see also Britton, Casework Techniques in Child Care Sen'ices, 36 Soc. CASEWORK 3, 12
(1955); Glickman, Treatment ofthe Child and His Famil After Placement, 28 Soc. SERV. REV. 279
(1954); Mandelbaum, Parent-Child Separation: Its Signifcance to Parents, Soc. WORK, Oct. 1962,
at 26.
267. See S. JENKINS & E. NORMAN, supra note 35, at 245-49. Jenkins and Norman
found "[a] definite relationship. . . between feeling changes and visits to the children while
in care. Frequency of visiting the child in placement was associated with change for the
better in [both mothers' and fathers']. . . feelings toward the placement." Id. at 247; see also
Simmons, Gumpert & Rothman, supra note 30, at 227-33.
268. See, e.g., In re Leon RR, 48 N.Y.2d 117, 397 N.E.2d 374, 421 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1979);
In re Sanjivini K., 47 N.Y.2d 374, 391 N.E.2d 1316, 418 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1979). Occasionally,
courts even return the child to the natural parents; the paradigm case includes particularly
egregious agency behavior and a very sympathetic natural parent. See, e.g., id.
In recent years, some state legislatures have required, in certain termination actions, that
the judge deny a termination petition brought by an agency that has not provided services to
help the parent recover the child. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 384-b(4)(d), (7)(a), (7)(e)
(McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1982) (requiring agency's "diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parent-child relationship when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best
interests of the child").
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minimally accountable for their actions. Arguably, the proposed
standard would reduce this judicial policing of agencies: Because vis-
itation softens the impact on parents of a custody loss, judges might
be more willing to tolerate agency inaction. The consequence might
be that more parents would permanently lose custody, even though
fewer would have their visitation rights terminated.
While this possibility merits attention, it is not a persuasive ra-
tionale for rejecting the proposed standard. To begin with, the de-
nial of a termination petition provides few real incentives for an
agency to improve its future practices. The only penalty the agency
suffers as a result of this denial is having to keep the child in foster
care, a duty for which it would continue to receive government pay-
ments. And without an improvement in agency practices, most of
the parents whose visitation rights a judge has refused to terminate
because of agency inaction will in fact never regain custody. For
these parents, whether ajudge permanently deprives them of custody
under the proposed standard or refuses to order termination due to
agency inaction under the permanency program standard makes lit-
tle difference: Both approaches result in their permanent loss of cus-
tody but allow continued visitation.
Moreover, courts have available much better methods of ensuring
agency accountability than the denial of termination petitions. A
good child welfare system can and should employ early court review
of agency action or inaction,269 fines, 2 70 penalties, 27 1 and damage ac-
tions by parents and children 272 to improve agency practices. With
269. New York enacted the first mandatory court review of foster care placements in
1971. A followup study found that "court review clearly had an impact on agencies actions."
Festinger, supra note 4, at 237. Only 56% of sample children who were in foster care for two
years were still in care as compared to 68% in an earlier study. Id. at 243; see Fanshel, The Exit
of Children From Foster Care: An Interim Research Report, 50 CHILD WELFARE 65 (1971).
270. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw §§ 153-d, 387, 398(b) (McKinney 1976 & Supp.
1982) (state must refuse reimbursement of agency foster care expenditures when the agency
has failed to comply with various statutory requirements).
271. See, e.g., id. § 387 (a foster care agency that does not substantially comply with
state foster care standards may be declared totally ineligible to receive public funds).
272. See Note, supra note 43, at 696-701 (urging enactment of "legislation permitting
parents who have been wrongfully separated by child protection workers to recover damages
from state or local government. Damages should be recoverable on a theory of strict liability
when child protection workers fail to comply with statutorily mandated procedures or with
state or federal guarantees of due process."). Both state and federal courts, without the bene-
fit of specific statutory authorization, have recently permitted suits for inadequate foster care
services and supervision by foster children and natural parents. See, e.g., Doe v. New York
City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981) (action by child); McTeague v. Sos-
nowski, 617 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1980) (action by parents); Bradford v. Davis, 290 Or. 855, 626
P.2d 1376 (1981) (action by child).
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these means available, any minor reduction in agency incentives
which the proposed standard might produce should not pose a signif-
icant problem.
The proposed standard thus compares favorably with both the
traditional termination standard and the permanency program ap-
proach. On the basis of what we now know and the type of problems
the child welfare system currently confronts, this standard would ap-
pear to be the best available approach to parental rights termination.
The substantive test for termination which we have just evalu-
ated could be adopted by itself. But in order to ensure that the test is
effectively employed, the standard I am proposing includes some di-
rections regarding its implementation. It is to these directions that
we now turn.
B. Implementing the Standard
Under the proposed standard, a court may not consider termina-
tion until after the appointment of a guardian. In selecting a guard-
ian, a court should give preference to a child's foster parent and
adult relatives.273 Among the candidates, a court should also prefer
individuals who demonstrate the willingness and ability to accept the
child's relationship with a natural parent. 4
Upon appointment, the guardian will receive permanent custody
of the child, which may not be revoked without court approval.275
He will assume all the usual duties and privileges of parenthood, in-
cluding a duty to support the child 276 and the right to make all major
child care, educational, and medical decisions for the child. The
guardian's appointment will not, however, automatically sever the
child's relationship with his parents, siblings, or other members of his
natural family.27 7 On the contary, these family members will con-
273. The proposed standard gives preferential consideration to a current foster parent, a
foster parent with whom the child has resided for at least one year, and an adult relative of
the child.
274. Foster parent selection practices should, of course, reflect the same concerns. See
note 215 supra and accompanying text.
275. The guardianship appointment may be revoked upon a showing of good cause. As
with an adoption revocation procedure, this ensures that a failed guardianship placement can
be terminated. A natural parent, however, may not seek revocation of a guardianship ap-
pointment; appointment of the guardian terminates the parent's right ever to regain custody.
276. The proposed standard permits a current foster parent, who does not wish to as-
sume a duty to support the child but is an appropriate guardian in all other respects, to
become a guardian. The guardian's duty to support is also subject to any guardianship sub-
sidy he has been awarded.
277. This means that both the permanent guardian and the natural parent would enjoy
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tinue to have visitiation rights with the child unless the court specifi-
cally denies visitation.
The court may consider termination-the denial of visitation and
all other ancillary rights-immediately after appointment of a
guardian, or it may enter an interim visitation order, leaving final
resolution of the termination issue until a later date. The court will
not consider termination, however, without a request by the perma-
nent guardian. And, as with custody disputes in divorce cases, courts
will give great deference to any visitation plan agreed upon by the
guardian and natural parent.2
When the guardian and natural parent cannot agree on the ex-
tent and type of visitation to be allowed or on whether visitation
should be allowed at all, the court must decide on an appropriate
visitation plan. Again, as in a typical divorce case, the court should
use the best interests of the child standard as its criterion for evaluat-
ing the various alternatives presented by the natural parent and the
permanent guardian. 279 If, however, the guardian proposes restric-
reciprocal inheritance rights and the reciprocal right to maintain a wrongful death action.
Traditionally, both of these rights have been denied to foster parents and children. See, e.g.,
Evink v. Edwards, 106 Ill. App. 3d 635, 435 N.E.2d 1379 (1982) (foster parents who had
custody of 13 year-old girl from the time she was three days old until her death at age 13 and
who had consent to adoption from the child's natural mother could not maintain a wrongful
death action for the girl's death). In preserving tort and inheritance rights between the child
and natural parent, the proposed standard follows the law applicable to divorce cases rather
than the law applicable in adoption cases. This is desirable because, with continued visita-
tion between natural parent and child, their relationship would continue to be emotionally
significant to each and thus, like the relationship between a noncustodial divorced parent and
child, entitled to legal protection. The court may, in its discretion, terminate these reciprocal
rights to inheritance and to maintenance of a wrongful death award between parent and
child if it permanently denies parental visitation rights. See notes 278-84 infia and accompa-
nying text.
Any inheritance or wrongful death award resulting from the child's death would have to
be divided between the permanent guardian and natural parent. This could be done either
by simple division (four parents would each get a one-fourth share) or by the length of time
the child has spent in the care of each claimant.
278. "[A]vailable evidence on how the legal system processes undisputed divorce cases
involving minor children suggests that parents . . . have broad powers to make their own
deals. Typically, separation agreements are rubber-stamped . . . ." Mnookin & Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 955 (1979). In
the divorce context, the rationale for judicial deference to visitation plans that have both
parents' consent is that parents know their children's needs better than the court does. Courts
should treat visitation plans in the guradianship context similarly.
279. In structuring a visitation plan, the court should, as it would in a divorce case,
focus on the child's age and developmental needs. For example, an older child may benefit
most from longer but less frequent visits, whereas a younger child may benefit most from
shorter but more frequent visits. Also, the court should order counseling or supervised visita-
tion if it finds them to be in the child's best interest.
PARENTAL RIGHTS
tions on parental visitation in excess of those typically imposed when
a child is in foster care,280 he must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the requested restriction is necessary to protect the
child from specific, significant harm.28' Foster care standards them-
selves permit only minimal visitation;28 2 even greater restrictions on
visitation should therefore require a showing of necessity.28 3
If the guardian requests termination of all visitation and contact,
he must again show that this step is necessary to protect the child
from specific, significant harm. 84 Furthermore, he must make this
showing by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere
preponderance, since this step has a greater impact on both parent
and child than the mere restriction of visitation. Simple restrictions
on contact, such as temporary supervision or denial of overnight vis-
its, pose less of a threat to the child's emotional well-being and less of
an infringement on the parent's interests; no total deprivation occurs,
and the court can subsequently modify the restriction. By contrast,
termination completely severs the parent-child tie and therefore calls
for a higher standard of proof.
28 5
In order to terminate or impose restricted visitation, a court must
find that this step is necessary to protect the child from harm that is
specific and szgnificant. Vague assertions, such as "visits with the par-
ent are upsetting to the child," are insufficient to meet this standard.
If the visits upset the child simply because they trigger his repressed
feelings about separation, they may not be harmful: "The short term
280. In jurisdictions with inadequate visitation standards or with none at all, the per-
manent guardianship legislation should specify some standards.
281. Placing the burden of proof on the guardian is fairer in light of the parties' relative
abilities to present evidence. The guardian, who is chosen by the foster care agency, has the
agency's resources at his disposal; he should therefore be better able to present evidence both
about possible harm to the child from visitation and about the availability of services such as
counseling.
282. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
283. Protecting this minimum level of visitation will also help bring child welfare law in
line with divorce law: Divorced parents are unlikely to face more restrictive visitation than
the foster care standard provides.
284. A court should also require clear and convincing evidence of harm to the child
before suspending visitation privileges for any appreciable period of time. Cf. In re Pablo C.,
108 Misc. 2d 842, 439 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (requiring clear and convincing evidence
before suspending visitation privileges for parent of foster child); In re Rhine, - Pa. Super.
-, 456 A.2d 608, 614 (1983) (the state may not deny- foster care visitation privileges unless it
"demonstrates with clear and convincing evidence that even supervised visitation would se-
verely endanger the child").
285. The Supreme Court has recently held that a "clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard" is constitutionally mandated for permanent termination orders. See Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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disadvantage of the child being upset by the visit. . .[might instead
be] outweighed by the long term benefit [of ventilating his feelings
about separation]. 286 To evaluate the possible harm to the child, a
court may order a psychiatric evaluation of the child and his natural
parent. This evaluation should focus on the source of the child's
emotional problems, on whether visitation and contact themselves
are likely to resolve these problems over time, and on the desirability
of some type of visitation restrictions.
The psychiatric evaluation-and ultimately the court's deci-
sion-should also focus on the child's current symptoms; psychiatry's
ability to predict future problems in a child's development is too un-
certain to justify present visitation restrictions. 287 Moreover, such
speculation is unnecessary, since the court can later modify its visita-
tion order.
In reaching a decision on visitation or termination with regard to
an older child, the court may consider the child's wishes, but should
not regard them as conclusive. This approach, similar to that em-
ployed in divorce litigation, is appropriate because a child's feelings
of loyalty to his guardian or natural parent will often color his stated
opinion. Moreover, giving the child full responsibility over the visi-
tation decision would encourage parental attempts to influence him,
placing the child in the difficult position of having to choose between
his loved ones.288
Under the proposed standard, a termination hearing will almost
invariably involve issues beyond the ordinary layperson's compe-
tence. To ensure that all of the relevant evidence is adequately
presented, both the guardian and the natural parent therefore should
286. Littner, supra note 194, at 179; see also notes 208-14 supra and accompanying text.
287. The best known predictive study is MacFarlane, Perspectives on Personality Consisteny
and Changefrom the Guidance Study, 7 VITA HUMANAE 115 (1964). Arlene Skolnick has ob-
served that "[t]he most surprising [finding] of the [MacFarlane study] was the difficulty of
predicting what thirty year-old adults would be like even after the most sophisticated data
had been gathered on them as children." A. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: Ex-
PLORING MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 378 (1973),quotedin Mnookin,supra note 50, at 259; see
also GFS I, supra note 8, at 49-52 (no one can "predict in detail how the unfolding develop-
ment of a child and his family will be reflected in the long run in the child's personality and
character formation').
288. These two factors have led to the use of a similar approach in divorce litigation:
"The preference of the child above the age of discretion may be given weight in the judge's
decision [regarding postdivorce custody], but it is normally not controlling." Mnookin, supra
note 50, at 245 n. 149; see also Siegel & Hurley, The Role of the Chids Preference in Custody Proceed-
ings, 11 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1977); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1396 (1965). The child's age and the inten-
sity of his feeling often influence the weight given to the child's preference. See R. MNOOKIN,
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 639-40 (1978).
[Vol. 35:423
PARENTAL RIGHTS
be represented by counsel. If either the natural parent or the guard-
ian cannot afford an attorney, the court should appoint one for
him.289
After evaluating the evidence, the court should issue a written
decision describing in detail the basis for its order. All parties in-
volved should be able to appeal that decision. 2 °
C. Three Tpical Problems
Under any termination standard, there will be hard cases. In-
deed, each case will pose some special difficulties for a court to re-
solve. But a few hard cases are likely to recur. Thus, with the
general requirements of the standard in mind, let us examine three of
them.
1. The inadequate parent.
Due to a disabling mental illness, retardation, addiction, or char-
acter defect, the parent of a foster child may, by ordinary standards,
be inadequate. This parent's ability to interact with the child might
be quite limited; at certain times, such as periods of hospitalization, it
may be totally nonexistent.
The threshold inquiry under the proposed standard is whether a
continued relationship with the parent will cause the child to suffer
specific, significant harm. The mere fact that the parent is "inade-
quate" does not diminish his importance to the child.291 Nor should
the law simply presume harm from the existence of a parental condi-
tion, such as mental illness or addiction, that prevents the parent
from maintaining custody of the child. Instead, the court must focus
on the type of harm that might occur because of continued visitation and
contact. For example, contact with a parent who cannot control vio-
289. The Supreme Court has held that parents do not have an absolute right to counsel
in termination proceedings, leaving the decision whether due process calls for counsel in any
particular case to the trial court. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
However, I consider the assistance of counsel essential for any parent who wishes to contest
termination under the proposed standard. The proposed standard requires the court to con-
sider evidence on whether visitation would harm the child. Presentation of this evidence will
certainly involve testimony by the guardian and, in many cases, will involve testimony by
psychiatric experts. An indigent parent cannot be expected to cross-examine these witnesses
effectively without legal assistance.
290. To avoid extended uncertainty and instability for the child, an expedited appeal
process is desirable. Cf. GFS I, supra note 8, at 46-49 (decisions involving children should
comport with the child's sense of time).
291. See note 213 supra and accompanying text.
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lent impulses is likely to produce harm; contact with a parent who is
loving but suffers serious intellectual deficiencies is not.
In cases where the parent's behavior is upsetting to the child, the
court must assess the extent to which the child is disturbed, the rea-
sons for the disturbance, and whether the distress could be alleviated
by means that would still permit the child to retain the benefits of
some parental contact. In making this assessment, the court should
consider the child's age and the severity of the parent's behavioral
problem. For example, an abused older child may benefit from pa-
rental visitation accompanied by counseling; an abused infant or tod-
dler, however, would not have the cognitive ability to understand his
parent's behavior. Thus, depending on how severe a reaction the in-
fant has to his parent, a court might have to order cessation of paren-
tal contact to avoid harm.
2. The parent who has not maintained contact.
Some natural parents maintain only sporadic contact with their
child during his initial stay in foster care and then later stop visiting
him altogether. Such parents often repeatedly miss appointments
with the child and with agency social workers. When asked, they
may profess interest in the child, but they seem incapable of expres-
sing this interest actively. In the most extreme cases, these parents
are, for all practical purposes, complete strangers to their children.
Faced with facts of this sort, the judge must attempt to ascertain
both the impact of the parent's behavior on the child and the expla-
nation for that behavior. Depending on the child's age and life expe-
rience, scheduled visits with the parent that do not materialize may
either greatly disturb him or leave him relatively unaffected. 92 The
parent's behavior may simply reflect deep-seated feelings of guilt and
helplessness engendered by his child's placement; 293 if so, the judge
probably should order a period of intensive counseling before issuing
a final order.2 94 Conversely, if the parent's behavior reflects a desire
292. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 152, at 239, 246-47 (even a partial
relationship with sporadic, infrequent contact can protect the child from a sense of abandon-
ment and thus be generally beneficial).
293. Placement causes many parents of children in foster care to experience negative
feelings about themselves. Such feelings may conflict with these parents' wish to maintain
contact with their children. See S. JENKINS & E. NORMAN, supra note 35, at 107; D. KLINE &
H. OVERSTREET, supra note 165, at 170-73; Simmons, Gumpert & Rothman, supra note 30, at
277.
294. Counseling should be aimed at helping the parent understand that he can still play
an important emotional role in the child's life even though he cannot resume custody. Cf. D.
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to avoid the child, and the child has been deeply upset by the par-
ent's haphazard visitation, the judge may find that termination is in
the child's best interests. In this case, unless the guardian appears
able to effectively assist the child in understanding and accepting the
loss of his parent, the judge may choose to order a period of psychiat-
ric counseling for the child.295
3. Conflict between guardian and natural parent.
A foster child's guardian and natural parent may exhibit hostility
toward each other that causes the child to experience conflicting loy-
alties. In this situation, the court's first task is to discover the cause of
these hostilities.
In some cases, the guardian's hostility will justifiably stem from
the parent's behavior toward the child. In such instances of legiti-
mate hostility, the court should take the guardian's concerns into ac-
count in determining whether restricted contact or outright
termination is appropriate. On the other hand, if the guardian and
the natural parent are hostile to each other without good cause,296
the court probably should enter an interim order requiring media-
tion or joint counseling to help each party understand the problems
their feuding may cause the child and to help them resolve their con-
flict.297 If this process fails to resolve the conflict, the court must then
determine the extent to which the conflict is harming the child and
decide whether it must order restrictions on contact or termination to
protect him.
D. What the Proposed Standard Will Not Accomplish
The proposed standard is, I believe, a workable solution to the
problem of parental rights termination and the one which, among
available alternatives, creates the fewest risks for children in long
term foster care. But, obviously, the proposed standard is not a pan-
acea. It will not turn hard cases into easy ones. Nor will it, any more
than can any termination standard, cure the ills of the child welfare
KLINE & H. OVERSTREET, suora note 165, at 172-73 (parent's constructive participation in
placement can reduce intensity of shame).
295. This counseling should be aimed at providing the child with a sense that his parent
is unable rather than uncaring.
296. Guardian selection procedures that give preference to individuals who can accept
the child's relationship with a natural parent should keep the number of unjustifiably hostile
guardians to a minimal level. Set text accompanying note 274 supra.
297. Cf. Benedek & Benedek, supra note 141, at 264-65 (suggesting a similar approach
for divorcing parents).
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system. Contrary to the representations of some permanency pro-
gram advocates, the problems of children "adrift" in foster care will
not be resolved simply by altering their legal relationships with their
natural parents; by the time any such change becomes appropriate,
most of the damage to the children already will have been done.
Hence, the proposed standard is only a preliminary step toward
achieving a more pressing goal-restructuring the entire foster care
system so that it will better meet the needs of both children and their
parents. The time has come to recognize that simply taking some
children out of placement will not make the deficiencies in foster care
practice and policy go away. As one former foster child recently put
it, "[t]here'll always be kids like me, and somehow we've got to come
up with a system for supervising them while they're supervising us. "298
Only when the law provides children in foster care and their natural
parents with adequate means to ensure that the child welfare system
fulfills its promises will the problem of foster care drift be resolved.
V. CONCLUSION
Terminating parental visitation rights is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient means for providing stable, permanent homes to children
in foster care. Furthermore, terminating visitation rights may create
new problems for the child in foster care by depriving him of all
opportunity to form a realistic relationship with his natural parent.
For these reasons, neither traditional termination standards nor those
proposed as part of the new permanency program serve the best in-
terests of foster children. Therefore, I have proposed instead a stan-
dard that would allow termination only when necessary to protect
the child from specific, significant harm which cannot be averted by
less drastic means.
The proposed standard satisfies the various criteria to which a
termination standard should respond. It conforms to the general
goals of child welfare law and to the evidence currently available on
child development. It makes use of our experience with divorce liti-
gation and avoids discrimination against poor families. It poses no
significant resource problems and creates no significant adverse in-
centives for parental or agency behavior. It appears to be the best
available approach to the problem of parental rights termination.
298. Collins, Coutrs, the Congress and Citizens Are Redefing the Concept of Foster Care, N.Y.
Times, July 22, 1981, at B4, col. 6.
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APPENDIX-PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR PERMANENT GUARDIANSHIP,
PARENTAL VISITA TION, AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS
1. Defnitions
When used in this Act, unless explicitly provided otherwise,
a) "adult" means a person at least eighteen years old;
b) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen;
c) "court" means a court designated under state law to adjudi-
cate petitions to terminate parental rights;
d) "natural parent" means a child's father, mother, or both;
e) "permanent guardian" means one or more persons appointed
by a court in accordance with the requirements of section 4 of
this title;
f) "restricted visitation" means visitation that is shorter, less fre-
quent, or subject to greater restrictions than that authorized
under state law, regulation, administrative order, or adminis-
trative policy for a natural parent whose child is in foster care;
or
"restricted visitation" means visitation that is shorter, less fre-
quent, or subject to greater restrictions than [a standard to be
established by the legislature or by an appropriate state
agency to which the legislature has delegated the task]*;
g) "visitation" means any and all forms of contact and commu-
nication between the natural parent and child, including but
not limited to in-person visits at any location, telephone calls,
and written correspondence.
2. Rights and Obligations of a Pennanent Guardian
a) A permanent guardian has all of the rights which state law
accords to a parent with legal custody of a minor child, in-
cluding the right to determine the child's residence and
school, authorize medical care for the child, and consent to
the child's marriage. A permanent guardian will assume the
status of a parent under state law relating to intestate succes-
sion, maintenance of a wrongful death action, and the distri-
bution of any other rights and benefits determined under
state law.
b) A permanent guardian has all of the obligations of a parent
* In many states, there will be no legislative or administrative standards governing
foster care visitation; in other states, existing foster care visitation standards will be inade-
quate, vague, or non-uniform. In both situations, the state legislature must either establish
visitation standards or delegate this task to an appropriate state agency.
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with legal custody of a minor child. Except as specified in
section 4, these obligations include an obligation to support
the child.
c) The rights and obligations of a permanent guardian may not
be terminated without approval of the court, to be granted
only upon a showing of good cause.
3. Selection of a Pemanent Guardian
a) The following persons may become a permanent guardian:
i) a married couple at least one of whom is an adult;
ii) an unmarried adult.
b) In selecting a permanent guardian, the court must give pref-
erence to the following persons:
i) a foster parent or other adult with whom the child has
resided for a continuous period of at least one year;
ii) a foster parent or other adult with whom the child cur-
rently resides;
iii) an adult relative of the child.
c) In selecting a permanent guardian, the court must also give
preference to individuals who have demonstrated a willing-
ness and ability to accept the child's maintenance of a rela-
tionship with his natural parent.
4. Appointment of a Pennanent Guardian
a) A permanent guardian may be appointed only by judicial or-
der following a judicial decision permanently depriving the
child's natural parent of legal custody.
b) When appointing a guardian, the court may provide, if doing
so is consistent with the best interests of the child, that the
guardian will assume no support obligation or only a limited
support obligation.
5. Effect of Permanent Guardian's Appointment on Existing Rights and
Obligations
a) The appointment of a permanent guardian for a child will
terminate all existing rights and obligations of the child's nat-
ural parents except:
i) the right to visitation with the child;
ii) the status of a parent for purposes of state law relating to
intestate succession, maintenance of a wrongful death ac-
tion, and the distribution of any other rights and benefits
determined under state law.
b) The appointment of a permanent guardian will not terminate
any existing relationship, rights, or benefits, as provided
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under state law, as between the child and his natural siblings,
grandparents, and other relatives. All existing visitation
rights between the child and his natural relatives will be
preserved.
6. Proceedings Between a Permanent Guardian and Natural Parent Regarding
the Natural Parent's Visitation Rights
a) Following the appointment of a permanent guardian, the
court will determine the visitation rights of the natural
parent.
b) When the natural parent and permanent guardian concur on
a visitation schedule, the court must approve their agreement
unless a preponderance of the evidence establishes that their
agreement is not in the best interests of the child.
c) When the natural parent and permanent guardian do not
concur on a visitation schedule, the court will, subject to sub-
sections (d) and (e) of this section, order visitation in accord-
ance with the best interests of the child.
d) In order to impose restricted visitation, the court must find,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that any restriction(s)
imposed is (are) necessary to protect the child from specific,
significant harm that cannot be averted by a less drastic
alternative.
e) In order to suspend parental visitation for six months or
longer or to permanently deny parental visitation, the court
must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that such sus-
pension or permanent denial of parental visitation is neces-
sary to protect the child from specific, significant harm that
cannot be averted by a less drastic alternative.
f) The permanent guardian bears the burden of proof in estab-
lishing the need for restricted visitation, suspended visitation,
or permanent denial of visitation rights.
g) When the court permanently denies parental visitation rights,
it may, if doing so is consistent with the best interests of the
child, deprive the natural parent of his or her parental status
under section 5(a) (ii) herein.
7. Appointment of Counsel
In all proceedings between a permanent guardian and natural
parent, the court will appoint counsel for the natural parent and
permanent guardian if they are financially unable to obtain
counsel.
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8. Decisions and Appeals
a) The court may, in its discretion, enter an interim visitation
order to apply for no more than six months.
b) When issuing a final visitation or termination order, the court
shall issue a written opinion giving reasons for its decision and
describing the evidence upon which the order is based.
c) A final order may be appealed by any party.
d) All appeals from orders on visitation or termination shall be
heard on an expedited basis.
9. Enforcement and Modifiation of Orders
a) Any party may petition the court to seek enforcement or
modification of an existing visitation order.
b) Modification of an existing order may be obtained upon a
showing that, due to changed circumstances:
i) modification of the order is necessary to protect the
child's best interests, to be determined in accordance with
the provisions of section 6 herein; or
ii) modification is necessary to prevent undue hardship to
the petitioning party.
c) A permanent guardian may not be prohibited from changing
his residence or employment in order to enforce existing visi-
tation rights, except on a showing of exceptional
circumstances.
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